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Abstract
This article argues that Captagon trafficking in the Middle East has become a Syrian state-led initiative, spearheaded by the al-Assad regime in Syria, in partnership with terrorist organizations well versed in narcoterrorism, such as Hezbollah, which in turn has become a threat to neighboring regions, in this case the European Union. Although there is no legal definition for narco-states or narco-terrorism, both phenomena have the potential to destabilize regional security and the means to expand into other spaces. Therefore, an institutional effort is deemed necessary on the part of the European Union and its Member States to propose a clear strategy to address the threat posed by the synergy of a potential narco-state in the form of the Syrian Arab Republic and its links with Hezbollah to facilitate Captagon trafficking.
Keywords
Narco-State, Narco-Terrorism, Syria, Hezbollah, Captagon
What is Captagon: Origin and Current Issues
Several research papers, policy reports, and specialized pharmacological documents have all characterized Captagon as the trade name for the pharmacological compound Phenethylline Hydrochloride, produced in West Germany in the 1960s, used to treat narcolepsy, depression, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder also known as ADHD.[1]
Originally, Captagon tablets contained about 50 milligrams of Phenethylline (whose molecular formula is C18H23N5O2, and chemical name is 7-[2-[(α-Methylphenethyl)amino]Ethyl)Phenethylline Hydrochloride) synthesized from Amphetamine. Phenethylline is also known as amphetamine-ethyl-theophylline and amphethylline. Phenethylline was first synthesized in 1961 by the pharmaceutical company Degussa AG (Deutsche Gold- und Silber-Scheide-Anstalt, “German Gold and Silver Refining”, today Evonik-Degussa GmbH, after acquisition by RAG) to investigate the side effect of theophylline derivatives (which is also a codrug of phenethylline) on the cardiovascular and central nervous systems.
Briefly, Phenethylline is metabolized in the human body from its constituent components Amphetamine and Theophylline, which are naturally occurring alkaloids.[2] Therefore, Captagon should be understood as a synthetic drug obtained by chemically synthesizing Amphetamine. Synthetic drugs began to appear in the early 20th century as a result of pharmaceutical research aimed at contributing to the advancement of medicine using synthetic tranquilizers, stimulants and anesthetics. In essence, Captagon and other amphetamine-related drugs are used as stimulants. Stimulants can be in the form of tablets, powder, crystals or liquid, ingested orally, by snorting or injecting into the bloodstream, with the purpose of increasing energy levels, reducing the need for rest. [3]
The two components of Captagon tablets composed of fenethylline (amphetamine and theophylline) act separately in the brain, simultaneously enhancing their psychoactive effects. Fenethylline was considered a potentially addictive substance and was included in the 1971 United Nations Psychotropic Substances protocol II.[4] After fenethylline was considered an addictive substance and in 1986, protocol II signatory countries moved to control the production of Captagon tablets, although some European countries continued to allow the prescription of small amounts of Captagon, such as France, even well into 2013.[5] However, Captagon capsules containing fenethylline were still available throughout Europe in the late 1980s, even after the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) ordered the destruction of stocks after 1986. Allegedly, 4 tons of fenetylline-filled Captagon tablets were in Germany, Spain and Switzerland. According to a report by the European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA) covering the status of Captagon trafficking in 2018, half of the German and all of the Swiss capsules were destroyed.
Regarding the remaining German capsules, they were shipped to the Netherlands in 2001. The EMCDDA notes that in the mid-2000s, the Netherlands was the only country in Europe that possessed large quantities of Captagon tablets containing fenethylline, and by 2009 they had been exhausted. However, since 2018, large quantities of Captagon tablets have been seized in Europe, with a total amount of 127 million tablets and 1,773 kilograms as of September 2023. As stated by the EMCDDA, Captagon tablets arriving in the Middle East and containing mainly Amphetamine go through a similar production process as synthetic drugs developed in Europe.
Amphetamine production centers have been located in the Netherlands and Belgium, making it difficult to intercept Amphetamine-type Stimulants (ATS) such as Captagon in the Schengen area, according to a report published by the EMCDDA in collaboration with EUROPOL on Amphetamine trafficking. In this regard, several European agencies have determined that both synthesizing and tableting operations are carried out in different locations and countries, and by separate organized criminal groups, in order to avoid detection. After authorities in Europe and the Arabian Peninsula (the largest consumer market for Captagon) began to become familiar with the methods of shipping Captagon from Syrian and Lebanese ports, smuggled on commercial vessels by shell companies and tycoons close to the regime of Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah, smaller shipments via overland routes through Turkey to mainland Europe have become the alternative recourse. This article seeks to elucidate the current situation of Captagon trafficking in the Mediterranean basin, and to bring to public light the organized crime networks operating in European space with links to the Syrian regime headed by Bashar el-Assad, and the latter's collaboration with the Lebanese Shiite-oriented terrorist organization, Hezbollah.
Involvement of the Bashar al-Assad regime and coordination with Hezbollah
Several reports by German authorities, corroborated by their intelligence operating in German embassies in the Middle East, have concluded that the Captagon produced in the region (especially in Syria and Lebanon) has been carried out under the patronage of the al-Assad regime.[6] According to organized crime groups operating in Europe, containers shipped from Syria must pay a fee for each container delivered from Syrian ports to Europe or a monthly fee to the Syrian Army's elite 4th Armored Division, which form the core of the security forces along with the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate, or Mukhabarat, led by Kamal Hassan, and which is under direct control of President Bashar al-Assad through the National Office of the Central Command of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party - Syria Region. Heading the elite 4th Armored Division of the Syrian Army as commander is General Maher al-Assad, younger brother of President Bashar al-Assad, who also happens to be a member of the Central Committee of the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party - Syria Regional Branch, and he leads the Republican Guard, whose commander is President Bashar al-Assad. [7]
Syria's role as a production and trafficking hub for Captagon cannot be understood without alluding to the dynamics brought about by the civil war in the country since 2011. Once the war economy emerged, factions would dispute the revenues obtained from arms trafficking, extortion, human trafficking, prostitution, blackmail, narcotics and the effective monetization of territory. Since 2013, Captagon production and trafficking have increased in the country, driven mainly by organized crime networks operating in Syria, Lebanon and the Middle East in general, due to the collapse of law and order.[8] Accusations of drug trafficking between warring factions were widespread during the early stages of the conflict. Case in point is the case of Jabhat-al-Nusra during 2012 in which it destroyed Captagon laboratories in the Qalamoun mountains previously held by the Syrian government only to be later dismissed and accused along with the Free Syrian Army by the Iranian state media. However, the group most associated with Captagon trafficking in the international media has been ISIS.[9] In a twist of irony, and serving the purpose of the real ringleaders of Captagon trafficking and production plots in the region, ISIS has had no proven links to large-scale Captagon seizures in the Mediterranean basin, the Levant, or the Middle East in general.
However, international news agencies have accused ISIS of involvement in trafficking the precursors needed to synthesize Captagon pills. Despite the alleged taboo on drug use in orthodox Islamic observance, terrorist organizations that appropriate Islamic values claim and defend the use of ATS (Amphetamine Type Stimulants) such as Captagon under the cover of Sharia (Islamic law) arguing its medical necessity and battle-enhancing potential.[10] Following the significant seizure of Captagon pills in Salerno during July 2020 by the Guardia di Finanza (the Italian agency in charge of investigating financial crimes attached to the Ministry of Interior) and despite mainstream media across Europe pushing the narrative that ISIS was behind the shipment of 187 kilograms of Captagon, evidence of other groups such as Hezbollah and networks led by senior Syrian officials took center stage.[11] In this regard, media outlets have inaccurately reported on the use of Captagon in terrorism-related incidents, such as the events in Paris during November 2015 or instances of violence against civilians in Iraq and Syria by ISIS.[12]
Since 2018 and the decline of ISIS' effective territorial control over various parts of Iraq and Syria, the narcotics trade (especially Captagon) was reconfigured to the benefit of “narco-entrepreneurs‘’ who are loyal to the al-Assad regime, being able to access precursor chemicals imported from Latin America, Russia and India through the government-controlled zones near the Jordanian and Iraqi border, and the conveniently porous Lebanese border.[13]
As for Captagon production in Syria, the largest concentration of synthesizing laboratories is located in Daraa province. The reason for this is the proximity of Daraa province to the Jordanian border, which facilitates access to a land route to major consumer markets in the Arabian Peninsula. According to reports by Syrian analysts Shaar and al-Alwani, Captagon production facilities emerged in Daraa province after regime forces secured control of the desert area extending into Jordan in 2018, strengthening production and trafficking networks affiliated with both Hezbollah and the Syrian Army's elite 4th Armored Division.[14]
The second major production area in the country is in the Deir al-Zor province in the east towards the Iraqi border. The production facilities in this eastern province also prove to be a valuable land route to the Gulf via the al-Qaim highway, but also the proximity to Iraq, which has become a consumer country as well as a transit hub. The Homs governorate to the southwest gave way to the two aforementioned regions, however, the proximity of this region to the Lebanese Beqaa Valley hosts several mobile laboratories that are protected by Hezbollah and most of the elite 4th Armored Division of the Syrian Army led by Bashar al-Assad's brother, Maher al-Assad. [15]
As a result of the ban on the entry of agricultural products from Lebanon imposed by Saudi Arabia in April 2021, small-scale mobile Captagon manufacturing facilities located in the Beqaa Valley were transported to Syria in the direction of Daraa Governorate, increasing seizures at the Jordanian border and, further south, at the Al-Haditha border crossing with Saudi Arabia. In addition to production centers near border areas, there are also those located near ports and urban sectors such as those in the Damascus metropolitan area, Latakia, Aleppo and Al-Qusayr.[16]
In short, the al-Assad regime harbors a Captagon trafficking network run by family members and affiliated business tycoons loyal to the regime. Members of President Bashar al-Assad's family involved in Captagon trafficking include his cousin Wassim Badia al-Assad, or Samer Kamal al-Assad, son of Kamal and grandson of Ismail al-Assad, who was a half-brother of Hafiz al-Assad, as well as individuals with very close ties to the regime, such as Mohamed Shalish. [17] Samer Kamal al-Assad has been linked to several manufacturing operations in the port of Latakia, while Mohamed Shalish,[18], a well-known businessman has run fictitious companies, has established business links with warlords from the Beqaa Valley to move industrial-sized quantities of Captagon along the Levant coast. All three have a presence in Latakia Governorate as producers of Captagon.[19]
However, important research work carried out by different authorities at the European level linked to state and international security and specialized agencies such as the EMCDDA has determined that the main Captagon trafficking network in Syria is run by the 4th Elite Armored Division of the Syrian Army. The elite 4th Armored Division is composed of four brigades (38th, 40th, 41st and 42nd) and regiments (555th, 666th and 54th), brigades of Shiite militias and members of disbanded Syrian militias, the Suicide Battalion which includes 600 individuals of Alawite origin who would be used to carry out suicide actions in case of the fall of the state and its army. In addition, the Chemical Battalion has been added to the Fourth Armored Division, which is thus the only unit equipped with an arsenal of chemical weapons. The Fourth Armored Division has a Security Office which was created at the end of the 1990s to control the Division's personnel and prevent them from committing violations and military crimes, today it is also in charge of accumulating capital from illegal economic activities, in cooperation with pro-government businessmen. This accumulated capital is used to finance the fighters and actions of the Bureau and the elite 4th Armored Division, led by Maher al-Assad and Major General Ghassan Bilal. [20] The 42nd Brigade of the elite 4th Armored Division has provided surveillance services at Captagon manufacturing sites such as the one located at a former desalination plant in Kharab al-Shahem, near the Syrian-Jordanian border. According to Rose and Söderholm, the leadership of the elite 4th Armored Division has strong ties to the Syrian intelligence apparatus, which facilitates interaction with the Syrian grain, livestock and pharmaceutical industry, in turn enabling the smuggling of Captagon capsules concealed in ordinary goods, transported in military vehicles provided by the elite 4th Armored Division.[21]
This military unit has established a “checkpoint economy,” taxing smuggled goods from north of Damascus south to the Jordanian border with the help of the Shabiha networks, whose leadership includes Fawaz al-Assad and Mundhir al-Assad, both nephews of Hafiz al-Assad. Shabiha (“ghosts”) are state-sponsored, family-loyal Syrian government mercenary militias with members of the al-Assad family clan, such as the aforementioned, as leaders. These militias are composed of Alawite men paid by the regime to eliminate internal opposition figures and alleged fifth columnists, are anti-Sunni, and it is possible to find in their ranks former military and intelligence personnel loyal to the Baath (Arab Socialist Baath Party - Syrian Regional Branch), who have also been involved in smuggling Captagon across the Syrian-Lebanese border, with the help of Hezbollah.[22] Hezbollah for its part has been involved in narcoterrorism long before the start of the Syrian civil war in 2011. Since the end of the second Israeli-Lebanese war in 2006, Lebanon witnessed a surge of Hezbollah-run Captagon production facilities in and around the Beqaa Valley near the Syrian border to raise funds and revive financial stability during the post-war period.
The plan to produce synthetic drugs in the Hezbollah-controlled areas of Lebanon was supported from the outset by Iran, with Tehran providing the precursors needed to synthesize the drug.[23] During 2015, according to a report conducted by EMCDDA, 3.3 tons of BMK precursor and 16 tons of phenylacetic acid (which is used for amphetamine synthesization) were seized in Lebanon, in addition to the dismantling of Captagon production facilities in the Shiite town of Dar Al-Ouassa.[24] In the case of Captagon trafficking in the Levant, Hezbollah's involvement in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the al-Assad regime has boosted the Captagon market through Hezbollah's technical expertise and the mobility of its facilities in the Beqaa Valley near the Syrian border. Hezbollah is known to have assisted in the shipment of industrialized Captagon shipments from the ports of Tripoli and Beirut, serving as transshipment locations for the drug bound for the Syrian ports of Latakia and Tartous (the latter administered by the Russian Armed Forces). In addition, Hezbollah fighters have been seen assisting the Syrian Army's elite 4th Armored Division at key checkpoints along the Damascus-Amman corridor, the western part of Syria's Daraa province and even monitoring Captagon factories in Daraa al-Balad.[25] As in the case of the al-Assad clan, Hezbollah has managed to coordinate a wide network of businessmen and industry magnates well entrenched in Lebanese society. This, in turn, has made it easier for Hezbollah, under the leadership of Hassan Nasrallah, to deny any formal involvement with drug trafficking in order to offer a conservative Islamic image to public opinion, taking advantage of its position within Lebanese institutions to operate with impunity.[26]
Captagon seizures in the European Union
Since 2018, large quantities of Captagon tablets have been seized in Europe, with a total amount of 127 million capsules and 1,773 kilograms as of September 2023. As stated by the EMCDDA, Captagon tablets arriving in the Middle East and containing mainly Amphetamine go through a similar production process as synthetic drugs developed in Europe.[27] Amphetamine production centers have been located in the Netherlands and Belgium, making it difficult to intercept ATS (Amphetamine Type Stimulants) such as Captagon in the Schengen area, according to a report published by the EMCDDA in collaboration with EUROPOL on amphetamine trafficking.[28] Captagon tablets require the synthesis of amphetamine, followed by the manufacture of tablets (tableting).
The latest investigations carried out by the EMCDDA, published in September 2023 together with several European agencies, have determined that both synthesizing and tableting operations are carried out in different locations and countries, and by separate organized criminal groups, in order to avoid detection.[29] Once European and Gulf authorities began to become familiar with the methods of shipping Captagon from Syrian and Lebanese ports, smuggled on commercial vessels by shell companies and tycoons close to the al-Assad regime and Hezbollah, smaller shipments via overland routes through Turkey to continental Europe have become the alternative recourse.
In this regard, authorities realized that shipments were being sent to southern European ports not because these were potential consumer markets, but because the smugglers were seeking to receive EU customs stamps to divert the cargo to the Arabian Peninsula to avoid inspection at the destination ports.[30] In addition, Rose points to evidence that emerged from the seizure in the port of Salerno, near Naples, during June 2020, that the recipient of the shipment of more than 84 million Captagon pills was a well-known criminal syndicate: La Camorra, a criminal organization with Mafia connotations originating in Campania and one of the oldest and most powerful criminal organizations in Italy. [31] Along these lines, Captagon has indeed been transported from Europe to the Arabian Peninsula through storage facilities across the continent, even beyond the Mediterranean basin. Given what has been explained so far, although Europe has not proven to be a successful market for Captagon tablets compared to other synthetic drugs, the use of storage facilities and the involvement of drug trafficking networks and organized crime groups such as the Italian Camorra and the frequent involvement of Lebanese and Syrian nationals may create a trickle-down effect on local consumer markets.[32]
Response from the international community and the European Union
The European Union, through the Council of the EU, decided to list 25 individuals and eight entities under the EU's restricted measures (sanctions) in response to the developing narcotics situation in Syria and the Levant.[33] In a stance similar to that taken by the U.S. Treasury Department, among the organizations sanctioned by the European Union during April 24, 2023, the elite 4th Armored Division of the Syrian Army was included along with several dummy companies and private security outfits run by Syrian and Lebanese nationals.[34] Among the individuals on the list, Hassan Muhammad Daqqou (also affiliated with Hezbollah and the elite 4th Armored Division) and several cousins of Bashar al-Assad, such as Samir Kamal al-Assad and Wassim al-Assad, are also sanctioned. It is worth mentioning that the Council of the European Union recognizes on this occasion that the increase in the narcotics trade (especially in relation to Captagon) has become a state-run business model, benefiting the inner circle of the al-Assad regime and its allies inside and outside Syria.[35] The firmness shown by the European Union in establishing sanctions against shell companies and individuals involved in Captagon trafficking can therefore be interpreted as the first step towards a broader strategy to address the synthetic drug trade in the Mediterranean basin and the threats posed by a state-driven economic model based on the Captagon trade and its potential to strengthen criminal networks in Europe.[36]
However, an interagency strategy that resembles that of the United States and cooperation between member states in counter-narcotics operations specifically targeting Captagon has yet to materialize. Although the recent EU Drug Market Report published by the EMCDDA and EUROPOL in May 2023 made policy recommendations and set out operational guidelines for tackling amphetamine, methamphetamine and synthetic drugs in the EU, no explicit strategy has been developed by European agencies to tackle Captagon trafficking.
However, the need for an interagency strategy that resembles that of the United States and cooperation among member states in counternarcotics operations specifically targeting Captagon has yet to materialize. [37] Despite the fact that the latest EU drug market report published by the EMCDDA and EUROPOL in May 2023 made policy recommendations and set out operational guidelines for tackling amphetamine, methamphetamine and synthetic drugs in the EU, no explicit strategy has been developed by European agencies to tackle Captagon trafficking.[38]
Conclusions
Captagon seizures in European ports and on the continent over the past few years bring to light several security risks for the European Union. First, it demonstrates that European organized crime networks familiar with synthetic drug trafficking are willing to participate in the plot developed by those who benefit most from Captagon trafficking, primarily the Syrian regime and its allies such as Hezbollah. It would therefore be appropriate to incorporate Captagon trafficking into the 2022-2025 policy cycle of the European Multidisciplinary Platform against Criminal Threats (EMPACT). EMPACT is the European framework to foster operational cooperation in the fight against organized crime.[39] Second, it is worth mentioning that European institutions such as the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union have maintained ambiguous positions on the nature of Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, differentiating between its political and military wings. This may embolden Hezbollah cells to recruit among Syrian and Lebanese diaspora groups. This ambiguity could become a security vulnerability in terms of drug trafficking.
In this vein, the current state of conflict in the Middle East can also fuel radicalism and, as noted above, the tendency of terrorist groups and organized crime groups is to recruit from within the same demographic group. For this reason, European institutions should reconsider their position vis-à-vis Hezbollah. The forthcoming publication of EUROPOL's 2024 strategy document should go beyond the mere mention of Captagon, but should instead formulate operational mechanisms in the EU in the face of the possible spread of this drug.
Jorge Opalinski-Rimer*
Master in Geopolitics and Strategic Studies (Charles III University of Madrid)
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NOTES
[1] SHAAR, K. S., & AL-ALWANI, W. (Directores). (2023). SKY HIGH: Ensuing Narcotics Crisis The role of the Assad Regime. En Observatory of Political and Economic Networks. Observatory of Political and Economic Networks. Extraído el 13 de diciembre de 2023,p.6: https://opensyr.com/en/pages/p-18
[2]AL, I. A., SANTACROCE, R., ROMAN, U. A., CHILCOTT, R., BERSANI, G., MARTINOTTI, G., & CORAZZA, O. (2017). Captagon: use and trade in the Middle East. Human Psychopharmacology: Clinical & Experimental, 32(3), n/a-N.PAG, p.1 https://doi.org/10.1002/hup.2548
[3]World Drug Report. (2023). UNODC. United Nations Office of Drug and Crime. Retrieved November 21, 2023:https://www.unodc.org/unodc/data-and-analysis/world-drug-report-2023.html
[4]European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addictions EMCDDA (2023). Captagon trafficking and the role of Europe,p.8 https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/technical-reports/captagon-trafficking-and-role-europe_:en
[5]European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addictions EMCDDA (2023). Captagon trafficking and the role of Europe, p.9 https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/technical-reports/captagon-trafficking-and-role-europe_:en
[6]Bericht zu Captagon-Handel in Europa. (n.d). Bundeskriminalamt. Retrieved January 19th 2024, : https://www.bka.de/SharedDocs/Kurzmeldungen/DE/Kurzmeldungen/230911_Captagon.html
[7] EMCDDA (2023). Captagon trafficking and the role of Europe p.20
[8]ROSE, C. (2023). The reach of the trade in Captagon beyond the Middle East. European View, 22(2), 295-303, p.298. https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858231205755
[9]HAWASH, A. (2021). The Syrian economy at war: Captagon, Hashish, and the Syrian Narco-State. COAR. https://coar-global.org/2021/04/27/the-syrian-economy-at-war-captagon-hashish-and-the-syrian-narco-state/i
[10]ROSE, C., SÖDERHOLM, A., & New Lines Institute. (2022). The Captagon Threat: A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, and Regional Realities, in New Lines Institute. Extraido el 18 de diciembre de 2023,p.15:https://newlinesinstitute.org/state-resilience-fragility/illicit-economies/the-captagon-threat-a-profile-of-illicit-trade-consumption-and-regional-realities/
[11] EMCDDA (2023). Captagon trafficking and the role of Europe
[12]ROSE, C., SÖDERHOLM, A., & NewLines Institute. (2022). The Captagon Threat: A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, and Regional Realities. in New Lines Institute, p.15
[13] HAWWASH, A. (2021). The Syrian economy at war: Captagon, Hashish, and the Syrian Narco-State. COAR, p.10
[14]SHAAR, K. S., & ALALWANI, W. (Directores). (2023). SKY HIGH: Ensuing Narcotics Crisis The role of the Assad Regime. En Observatory of Political and Economic Networks. Observatory of Political and Economic Networks,p.17
[15] Ibid p.18
[16] ROSE, C., SÖDERHOLM, A., & NewLines Institute. (2022). The Captagon Threat: A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, and Regional Realities. in New Lines Institute, p.11
[17]VALENSI, C., & MIZRAHI, O. (2023). “Narcos,” Syria-Lebanon Style (A. Kurtz, E. Shavit, & J. Rosen, Eds.). Institute for National Security Studies. http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep47389
[18]HAWWASH, A. (2021). The Syrian economy at war: Captagon, Hashish, and the Syrian Narco-State. COAR, p.15
[19]ROSE, C., SÖDERHOLM, A., & NewLines Institute. (2022). The Captagon Threat: A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, and Regional Realities. En New Lines Institute, p.15
[20] Ibid, p.17
[21] Ibid, p.18
[22] Ibid, p.18
[23] KRAVITZ, M., & NICHOLS, W. (2016). A BITTER PILL TO SWALLOW: CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CAPTAGON, SYRIA, AND THE GULF. Journal of International Affairs, 69(2), 31–44,p.4 https://www.jstor.org/stable/26494337
[24] EMCDDA (2018). Captagon: Understanding today’s illicit market, p.21
[25] ROSE, C., SÖDERHOLM, A., & NewLines Institute. (2022). The Captagon Threat: A Profile of Illicit Trade, Consumption, and Regional Realities. in New Lines Institute,p.19
[26] GIO-TOC Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (March 25th 2022). Lebanon’s role in Syria’s Captagon trade | Global Initiative. Global Initiative. https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/syria-lebanon-captagon-ocindex
[27]EUROPEAN MONITOR CENTER FOR DRUGS AND DRUG ADDICTION EMCDDA. (2023). EU Drug Market: Amphetamine — Trafficking and supply. In the European Monitor Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction. European Monitor Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction. Consultado el 21 de diciembre 2023: https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/eu-drug-markets/amphetamine/trafficking-and-supply_en
[28] EMCDDA (2023). Captagon trafficking and the role of Europe, p.11
[29] EMCDDA (2023). Captagon trafficking and the role of Europe,p.10
[30] ROSE, C. (2023). The reach of the trade in Captagon beyond the Middle East. European View, 22(2), 295-303,p.298. https://doi.org/10.1177/17816858231205755
[31] Italian police seize record amount of Amphetamines shipped from Syria. (2020, July). Reuters. Retrieved on December 30th : https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2425EF/Al
[32]ROSE, C. (2023). The reach of the trade in Captagon beyond the Middle East. European View, 22(2), 295-303, p.299
[33] EMCDDA (2023). Captagon trafficking and the role of Europe,p.6
[34]Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2023/847 of April 24th 2023 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. (April 24th 2023). European Council. Consultada el 7 de enero de 2024: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2023/847
[35]Council Implementing Decision (CFSP) 2023/847 of April 24th 2023 implementing Decision 2013/255/CFSP concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Syria. (April 24th 2023). European Council. Retrieved January 7th 2024:http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec_impl/2023/847/oj
[36] ROSE, C. (2023). The reach of the trade in Captagon beyond the Middle East. European View, 22(2), 295-303
[37] ROSE, C. (2023). The reach of the trade in Captagon beyond the Middle East. European View, 22(2), 295-303
[38]Drug Market Reports. A Strategic Analysis. (2023). En EUROPOL. EUROPOL& European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction EMCDDA.Retrived on December 3rd 2023 https://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/eu-drug-markets_en
[39] EU Policy Cycle - EMPACT | Europol. (s. f.). Europol. https://www.europol.europa.eu/crime-areas-and-statistics/empact
