The Succession of the Dalai Lama: Geopolitical and Religious Challenges

Introduction

The succession of the Dalai Lama represents a crucial crossroads between religious tradition, cultural identity and geopolitical strategy. As the spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhism, the Dalai Lama not only embodies a lineage of reincarnated lamas, but is also a symbol of Tibetan autonomy and resistance against external domination. The current 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, born in 1935, has navigated a complex landscape marked by exile, advocacy for the Tibetan cause worldwide, and ongoing tensions with the People's Republic of China (PRC). His recent announcements regarding his succession, made on the occasion of his 90th birthday in July 2025, have intensified debates about authority, legitimacy and control.

On 2 July 2025, the Dalai Lama released a video statement affirming the continuity of the institution, countering earlier speculation about its possible dissolution and emphasising that his successor would be born in a free society and that the Gaden Phodrang Trust would have sole authority to identify him. This statement has heightened Beijing's concerns, as China insists that reincarnations must be approved by the state, considering this process to be an integral part of its sovereignty over Tibet. This measure highlights a broader struggle: China's efforts to Sinicise Tibetan Buddhism contrast with the Dalai Lama's push for autonomy, which attracts global actors and neighbouring states.

This monograph examines the historical, religious, and geopolitical dimensions of this issue, drawing on a variety of sources to provide a balanced and comprehensive analysis. It begins with the fundamental concepts of Buddhism, traces the evolution of Tibetan Buddhism and the role of the Dalai Lama, and culminates with contemporary challenges, including Tibet's strategic importance to China and relations with neighbouring states. Recent events, such as China's assertion that it has the “final say” in the reincarnation process and the convictions of Tibetan exiles, highlight the escalating tensions, with potential repercussions for India-China relations and regional stability (Anand, 2023; Panda and Pankaj, 2023; Xu, 2025).

Theoretical framework: Soft power, legitimacy and the geopolitics of religion

Applying Joseph Nye's theory of soft power, which posits that a country's appeal comes from its culture, political values and foreign policy rather than coercion (Nye, 2004), the Dalai Lama's global influence exemplifies Tibetan soft power, which leverages moral authority and cultural appeal to gain international support for autonomy. In contrast, China deploys Buddhist soft power to legitimise its rule, promoting state-approved lamas and investing in global Buddhist initiatives to counter the Dalai Lama's discourse (Kurnosenko, 2010; Woeser, 2018).

For their part, Max Weber's concepts of legitimacy—traditional, charismatic, and rational-legal—further illustrate this dynamic: the Dalai Lama derives his charismatic legitimacy from his spiritual role, while China seeks rational-legal sovereignty over reincarnation to erode traditional Tibetan authority (Weber, 1978).

From a geopolitical perspective, this contest reflects cultural and religious dimensions, in which religion serves as a tool for territorial control and identity formation (Agnew, 2010).

In comparative terms, transnational religious authority in Tibet mirrors cases such as papal succession in the Vatican or the historical claims of the Islamic caliphate, where spiritual legitimacy intersects with state sovereignty, often giving rise to conflicts over diasporic communities (Casanova, 1994; Mandaville, 2001).

From the perspective of soft power (Nye, 2004), the charismatic authority of the 14th Dalai Lama and his discourse of compassion/non-violence function as symbolic capital that attracts transnational support, influencing human rights and environmental agendas. This appeal, rather than coercion, explains the enduring nature of the Tibetan cause in liberal democracies and in the diaspora. The PRC's response combines cultural and tourism policies with a regulatory framework that seeks to translate influence into procedural legitimacy (e.g., the “golden coffin”), but whose external effectiveness is ambivalent in the face of global audiences.

In Weberian terms (Weber, 1947; Kalberg, 1980), the dispute over succession faces charismatic routinisation (identification of the 15th Dalai Lama by religious authorities linked to the Gaden Phodrang) with a legal-rational redefinition sponsored by the Chinese state (registration, approval and supervised ‘historical’ rituals). The eventual coexistence of two Dalai Lamas would consolidate parallel orders of legitimacy, with consequences for obedience and religious belonging inside and outside Tibet.

The geopolitics of religions (Casanova, 1994/2008; Guerra & Marconi, 2019; Reuber, 2015) explains how transnational spiritual authority interacts with state logics of territorial sovereignty and control of religious heritage. The dispute over reincarnation is both a doctrinal debate and a struggle for audiences, flows and sacred spaces, where the state and the transnational community compete to define the public legitimacy of the tradition.

From a comparative perspective, transnational religious authority operates through institutional and affective networks that do not depend on territorial sovereignty (Casanova, 2008). The Shiite marja‘iyya and the Ismaili imamate show how religious loyalty can be sustained by educational and welfare infrastructures (e.g., AKDN), reinforcing institutionalised charismatic legitimacy. Transposed to the Tibetan case, the CTA/Gaden Phodrang act as coordination nodes for a global community, while the PRC seeks to translate authority into state legality, generating a conflict of forums (transnational religious vs. state).

The succession of the Dalai Lama therefore represents a crucial crossroads between religious tradition, cultural identity and geopolitical strategy. I will have the opportunity to apply these concepts to the different points discussed in this monograph below.

Buddhism: definition, origins, geographical and historical spread, and branches

Buddhism is one of the world's major religions and philosophical systems, founded on the teachings of Siddhartha Gautama, known as the Buddha (‘the Enlightened One’), who lived in northern India between the mid-6th and mid-4th centuries BC. It emphasises the Four Noble Truths — suffering (dukkha), its origin in desire, its cessation and the path to cessation through the Eightfold Path — and fundamental practices such as meditation, ethical conduct and wisdom to attain enlightenment (nirvana). Buddhism rejects the existence of a creator god and focuses on impermanence, non-self (anatta) and interdependent arising (Gethin, 1998; Harvey, 2013).

The origins of Buddhism are geographical and historical, dating back to the eastern plains of the Ganges in ancient India, specifically to the ancient kingdom of Magadha (present-day Bihar and part of Nepal). Siddhartha Gautama was born in Lumbini (present-day Nepal), attained enlightenment under the Bodhi tree in Bodh Gaya (India), delivered his first sermon in Sarnath, near Varanasi, and entered parinirvana in Kushinagar. These places form the fundamental pilgrimage circuit. Buddhism emerged as a śramaṇa (ascetic) movement in the midst of Vedic Brahmanism, challenging caste hierarchies and ritualism (Bronkhorst, 2011; Samuel, 2008).

From its beginnings around the 5th century BCE, Buddhism gradually spread. Under Emperor Ashoka (r. 268-232 BCE) of the Maurya Empire, it expanded throughout the Indian subcontinent and beyond through missionary efforts, reaching Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Central Asia. In the 1st century CE, it entered China along the Silk Road, evolving into Mahayana forms. It reached Korea in the 4th century, Japan in the 6th century, and Tibet in the 7th century. In Southeast Asia, Theravada Buddhism took root in Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and parts of Vietnam in the 13th century. The decline in India was due to invasions, the Hindu revival and Muslim conquests in the 12th century, but it persisted in the Himalayan regions. Today, Buddhism has more than 500 million followers worldwide, concentrated in Asia (Buswell and López, 2014; Heirman and Bumbacher, 2012).

The main branches of Buddhism reflect doctrinal and practical differences:

• Theravada (‘Teaching of the Elders’): emphasises the Pali Canon and individual liberation through monastic discipline. Predominant in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia. Focuses on the historical Buddha and the ideal of the arhat.
• Mahayana (‘Great Vehicle’): emerged around the 1st century CE and emphasises compassion (bodhicitta) and the bodhisattva path to save all beings. It includes texts such as the Lotus Sutra. Predominant in China, Korea, Japan and Vietnam, with sub-schools such as Zen (chan) and Pure Land.
• Vajrayana (‘Diamond Vehicle’): A tantric extension of Mahayana, incorporating esoteric rituals, mantras, and deity yoga to quickly attain enlightenment. Prevalent in Tibet, Bhutan, Mongolia, and parts of Nepal and India. Integrates elements of Indian tantra and local traditions.

These branches evolved through cultural adaptation, with Theravada preserving the early teachings, Mahayana expanding soteriology, and Vajrayana emphasising transformative practices (Williams, 2008; Wedemeyer, 2013).

Tibetan Buddhism: definition, schools, history, beliefs and classification

Tibetan Buddhism, also known as Vajrayana or Lamaism, is a distinct form of Mahayana Buddhism that incorporates tantric practices, shamanic elements from the indigenous Bon religion, and Indian esoteric traditions. It is classified within the broader branch of Mahayana, but is often considered a third vehicle (Vajrayana) due to its emphasis on secret teachings (tantras) to accelerate enlightenment. Fundamental beliefs include the Mahayana ideals of emptiness (shunyata), compassion, and the bodhisattva vow, complemented by the use of mandalas, mudras, and guru devotion in Vajrayana. Practices aim to realise the innate Buddha nature through visualisation, empowerment rituals, and yogic techniques (Kapstein, 2006; Powers, 2007).

Historically, Buddhism entered Tibet in the 7th century under King Songtsen Gampo, who married Buddhist princesses from Nepal and China, and established temples such as the Jokhang in Lhasa. The ‘first diffusion’ reached its peak in the eighth century with Padmasambhava (Guru Rinpoche), who subdued local spirits and founded the Nyingma school. A ‘second diffusion’ in the eleventh century revived the tradition after persecution, giving rise to new schools. Tibetan Buddhism blended with Bon, incorporating deities and rituals, while prioritising Buddhist philosophy (Davidson, 2005; Snellgrove, 1987).

The four main schools (sectarian lineages) are:

• Nyingma (‘the ancient ones’): the oldest, dating back to Padmasambhava. It emphasises dzogchen (‘great perfection’) meditation for the direct realisation of the nature of mind. Less monastic, with lay practitioners (ngakpas).
• Kagyu (‘oral lineage’): founded by Marpa the Translator (11th century), it focuses on mahamudra (‘Great Seal’) and yogic practices. Sub-schools include Karma Kagyu (led by Karmapa) and Drikung Kagyu.
• Sakya (‘Grey Land’): Originating in the 11th century, known for the Lamdre (‘Path and Fruit’) teachings. Historically influential in politics, with learned monks.
• Gelug (‘Virtuous Tradition’): Founded by Tsongkhapa in the 14th century, emphasises monastic discipline, logic and the gradual path. Dominant since the 17th century, led by the Dalai Lama lineage.

These schools share fundamental doctrines but differ in emphasis and transmission. The body of beliefs in Tibetan Buddhism includes the Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma, tantric initiations, and the bardo (intermediate state) teachings of the Tibetan Book of the Dead. It is attributed to Mahayana, but uniquely integrates Vajrayana esotericism (Samuel, 1993; López, 1998).

In geopolitical terms, the cultural diffusion of Tibetan Buddhism has created transnational networks in which religious authority transcends borders, similar to the papal system of Catholicism or the umma of Islam, which fosters conflicts of legitimacy when state actors such as China seek to nationalise spiritual leadership (Bruno, 2019; McGranahan, 2010; Lavine, 1998). Weber's framework of legitimacy applies here, with the charismatic authority of the Dalai Lama clashing with China's rational and legal claims to monastic rule (Weber, 1978; Topgyal, 2023).

Countries with significant Tibetan Buddhist communities and sacred sites

Tibetan Buddhism thrives in communities across Asia and beyond, shaped by historical migrations and exile. The largest is found in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and adjacent Chinese provinces (Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu, Yunnan), where more than 6 million ethnic Tibetans live.

Bhutan has a predominantly Tibetan Buddhist population (around 75%), with vajrayana as the state religion, following the drukpa kagyu tradition, which has developed distinctive characteristics over the centuries despite its roots in Tibetan Buddhism.

Historical territorial wars with Tibet under previous Dalai Lamas have fostered political and religious rivalry, as evidenced by the absence of visits by the Dalai Lama since 1959.

Nepal is home to significant communities in the Himalayas (e.g. Sherpas and Tamangs), which represent around 10% of the population and predominantly follow the Nyingma school; the government has historically avoided engaging with the Dalai Lama so as not to provoke a reaction from China, whose last visit was in 1987 to Lumbini, and has banned celebrations of his birthday.

Mongolia, where Tibetan Buddhism arrived in the 13th century through Mongol-Tibetan alliances, has around 50% of followers, predominantly of the Gelug school; it is home to the third most important Gelug leader, the Khalkha Jetsun Dhampa Rinpoche, whose tenth reincarnation, a Mongolian boy born in the United States, was identified by the Dalai Lama in 2023. Landlocked and surrounded by China and Russia, Mongolia faces strategic vulnerability to Chinese pressure, which could divide the government's pragmatism and monastic resistance, especially given that only half of the population is Buddhist.

India is a key centre for exiles, with more than 100,000 Tibetans in Dharamsala (seat of the Central Tibetan Administration) and settlements in Karnataka, Himachal Pradesh and Ladakh. Smaller communities exist in Russia (Kalmykia, Buryatia, Tuva), Taiwan and Western countries such as the United States, Switzerland and Canada due to the diaspora (Schmitz, 2023; Anand, 2019; Smith, 2013).

In other Buddhist-majority countries, responses to succession vary. Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos and Cambodia, predominantly Theravada, have been cautious about welcoming the Dalai Lama for fear of Chinese repercussions, despite internal calls, and are unlikely to support his successor in the face of possible negative reaction.

Japan, where Buddhists represent around 46% of the population, has defied Chinese pressure by welcoming the Dalai Lama on 25 occasions, offering hope that invitations will continue, although Beijing's reactions could intensify with regard to the successor, whose authority China openly questions (Kumar, 2025; Toichi, 2023; Japanese Institute of International Affairs, 2024).

These communities highlight transnational religious authority, in which the Dalai Lama's influence transcends borders, similar to the role of the Pope in Catholicism or the Dalai Lama's own historical relations with the Mongols, whom he has protected as a priest (Mandaville, 2001; Bruno, 2019). China's attempts to domesticate Tibetan Buddhism contrast with this cross-border legitimacy, creating conflicts similar to those in Islam over the caliphal succession or in Christianity over schisms (Casanova, 1994; McGranahan, 2010).

The sacred sites of Buddhism include the four main sites: Lumbini (birth), Bodh Gaya (enlightenment), Sarnath (first teaching) and Kushinagar (parinirvana). Other key sites are Rajgir (second turning of the wheel) and Shravasti (miracles). In Tibetan Buddhism, the most sacred site is Mount Kailash in western Tibet, revered as the abode of Demchok (Chakrasamvara) and a place of pilgrimage for circumambulation (kora). It is sacred to Hindus (abode of Shiva), Jains and Bonpos. Lhasa is home to the Jokhang Temple (which houses the statue of Jowo Shakyamuni) and the Potala Palace (former residence of the Dalai Lama). Other places of interest are the Samye Monastery (the first in Tibet), Tashilhunpo (seat of the Panchen Lama) and Lake Manasarovar, near Kailash. The 24 great sacred sites of the Hevajra Tantra, such as Jalandhara and Oddiyana, are places of tantric power (Buffetrille, 2010; Huber, 1999).

The role of the Dalai Lama in the Great Game

The “Great Game” (the 19th-century rivalry between Great Britain and Russia for influence in Central Asia) drew Tibet into imperial geopolitics, with the Dalai Lama as a key figure.

Tibet's isolationist policy under the 13th Dalai Lama (1876-1933) aimed to preserve independence in the face of pressure from Qing China, Russia and Great Britain. In 1904, British forces under Francis Younghusband invaded Tibet to counter alleged Russian influence, imposing a treaty that opened up trade markets. The Dalai Lama fled to Mongolia and China in search of alliances (Hopkirk, 1990; French, 1994).

Russia, through the Buryat monk Agvan Dorzhiev, hired the Dalai Lama as a spiritual advisor, considering Tibet a Buddhist bridge to Asia. Dorzhiev's missions to St. Petersburg increased British fears of a Russian invasion. China, weakened by the collapse of the Qing dynasty, attempted to reassert its control, but the 1913 Simla Convention (boycotted by China) recognised Tibet's autonomy under Chinese sovereignty, with border concessions to Great Britain. The Dalai Lama navigated between these powers and proclaimed Tibet's independence in 1913, while maintaining a balance between religious ties with the Mongols and political neutrality. This period highlighted Tibet's role as a buffer zone, with the Dalai Lama as a diplomatic pivot against Chinese, British and Russian ambitions (Meyer and Brysac, 1999; Anand, 2009).

In the religious sphere, this period foreshadowed modern struggles for legitimacy, in which the charismatic authority of the Dalai Lama (Weber, 1978) was exploited to gain sovereignty, similar to how colonial powers used cultural geopolitics to justify their influence (Agnew, 2010; Kurnosenko, 2010).

Relations with the Mongols and the formation of political-religious power

Relations between Tibet and Mongolia date back to the 13th century, when the empire of Genghis Khan incorporated Tibet, establishing a “priest-patron” (cho-yon) dynamic. The Sakya lamas became spiritual advisors to the Mongol khans, which influenced the Yuan dynasty of China (1271-1368). This alliance granted Tibet autonomy in exchange for religious legitimacy (Petech, 1990; Rossabi, 1988).

The rise of the Gelug school in the 17th century consolidated the ties. The fifth Dalai Lama (1617-1682) allied himself with the Mongol leader Gushri Khan, who conquered the rival Tibetan factions and unified Tibet under Gelug rule. The Dalai Lama became temporal and spiritual leader, with Lhasa as the capital. This formed a theocratic state in which religious authority (the lamas) was intertwined with political power, administered through monasteries and aristocratic estates. The system persisted until 1959, with regents ruling during the Dalai Lama's minority. Mongolian support waned after the rise of the Qing, but cultural ties remained, and Mongolia adopted Tibetan Buddhism. Among recent tensions is Chinese pressure on Mongolia regarding recognition of the tenth Jetsun Dhampa, testing Beijing's control over Buddhist reincarnations (Jagannath, 2017; Kaplonski, 2014).

This priest-patron model exemplifies transnational religious authority, comparable to the papal-monarchical relations of medieval Europe, where spiritual legitimacy reinforced political sovereignty (Mandaville, 2001; Bruno, 2019). Weber's traditional legitimacy applies, as the role of the Dalai Lama merged religious tradition with political rule (Weber, 1978).

Historical definition of the Dalai Lama: from religious to political authority

The title ‘Dalai Lama’ (‘Ocean of Wisdom’) was conferred in 1578 by the Mongol ruler Altan Khan on Sonam Gyatso, the third in the lineage, and was applied retroactively to his predecessors. The lineage began with Gendun Drup (1391-1474), a disciple of Tsongkhapa. Initially religious and focused on Gelug teachings, the position gained political power through alliances with the Mongols (Sperling, 2001; Mullin, 2001).

The unification carried out by the fifth Dalai Lama made the position head of state, with powers over administration, law, and diplomacy. The government (Ganden Phodrang) controlled central Tibet (U-Tsang), parts of Kham and Amdo, and influenced Bhutan and Sikkim. Challenges included internal rivalries (e.g., the Kagyu opposition) and interventions by the Qing dynasty, which appointed ambans (residents) in Lhasa. From imperial China (Qing, 1720-1912), relations were those of sovereignty and vassalage, and the Qing approved reincarnations but had limited direct control. The Republic of China (1912–1949) claimed sovereignty but lacked the capacity to enforce it; the 13th Dalai Lama declared independence in 1913 (Goldstein, 1989; Shakabpa, 1984).

The origins of the Tibetan kingdom date back to the 7th century, under Namri Songzen, and expanded in competition with China, with roots in the mythical Yarlung dynasty. Between the 7th and 9th centuries, the empire embraced Indian Buddhism and spread to the western margins of Qinghai, Yunnan, Sichuan, and Gansu. Mongol and Chinese expansions reduced its reach, leading to an alternation between independence and subordination under the Tang, Yuan and Qing dynasties. In 1642, the fifth Dalai Lama became religious and political leader (van Schaik, 2011; Richardson, 1984).

The People's Republic of China invaded the country in 1950, imposing the 17-Point Agreement (1951), which recognised the authority of the Dalai Lama but integrated Tibet. The 1959 uprisings led to his exile. The consequences included cultural destruction during the Cultural Revolution, more than a million deaths and ongoing Sinicisation. Since the 1980s, Beijing has promoted economic growth, Han migration and infrastructure, but protests, such as those in 2008, and self-immolations persist. Despite official autonomy since 1951, relations remain tense, with the 1959 Lhasa uprising, which caused numerous casualties and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, secretly supported by the CIA until 1969. Economic data show 8% growth in 2019, but Tibet remains one of China's poorest regions in terms of per capita income. Xi Jinping's emphasis in 2020 on “ethnic unity” and the adaptation of Buddhism to socialism underscores fears of separatism, with China claiming authority over the 15th Dalai Lama (Dai, 2019; China Institute of International Studies, 2022).

This history reflects the evolution of Weber's legitimacy, which shifted from charismatic to rational-legal under Chinese rule, while the Dalai Lama maintains transnational authority comparable to that of the Pope during European secularisation (Weber, 1978; Casanova, 1994; Kurnosenko, 2010).

The current Dalai Lama: actions, geopolitical positions, alliances and succession plans

Tenzin Gyatso, enthroned in 1940, assumed absolute power in 1950 amid the invasion of the People's Republic of China. In exile since 1959, he established the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA) in Dharamsala, India, advocating non-violence and the middle way approach: genuine autonomy within China, not independence. Politically, he retired in 2011, democratising the CAT with an elected sikyong (prime minister) (Gyatso, 1990; Goldstein, 1997).

In the geopolitical arena, he has allied himself with India (which hosts the exiles), the United States (CIA support in the 1950s and 1970s, Nobel Peace Prize in 1989) and Europe. He collaborates with Taiwan, Mongolia and Bhutan, promoting interfaith dialogue. His alliances include the defence of the environment (Tibet as Asia's water tower) and human rights (Laird, 2006; Anand, 2023).

Nye's soft power is evident in the global appeal of the Dalai Lama, who attracts support through cultural diplomacy, in contrast to China's hard power tactics (Nye, 2004; Kurnosenko, 2010).

Succession plans, announced in 2025, grant authority to the Gaden Phodrang Trust, excluding China.

The Gaden Phodrang Trust is a non-profit organisation created by the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, in 2011, based in Dharamshala, India. Its name comes from the traditional residences of the Dalai Lamas at Drepung Monastery in Lhasa and reflects the legacy of the Tibetan government founded in the 17th century. Basically, the Trust exists for two important things: first, to ensure that the tradition of the Dalai Lamas continues, protecting the process of choosing the next Dalai Lama (the 15th) according to the traditions of Tibetan Buddhism, without anyone, especially the Chinese government, interferes. Second, to keep alive the Tibetan culture and values promoted by the Dalai Lama, such as compassion, peace, non-violence, harmony between religions and care for the environment.

It is led by the Dalai Lama himself, with the help of Samdhong Rinpoche, a trusted Tibetan monk and leader, and operates from His Holiness's office in Dharamshala. In addition, it is connected to other organisations, such as the Dalai Lama Trust, which focuses on charitable projects, and the Gaden Phodrang Foundation in Switzerland, which brings the Dalai Lama's values to the world.

The current Dalai Lama stated that reincarnation will occur in a ‘free country,’ possibly India, and that it could involve emanation before death. This challenges China's control, and the Dalai Lama emphasised continuity in his 2 July video, putting an end to rumours of dissolution. China rejects this and asserts that state mechanisms, such as the golden urn, have the final say (Panda and Pankaj, 2023; Xu, 2025; China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, 2024).

This challenge highlights conflicts of legitimacy, in which the charismatic authority of the Dalai Lama (Weber, 1978) competes with China's sovereign claims, parallel to historical papal elections or caliphal disputes (McGranahan, 2010; Mandaville, 2001).

China's position on succession and relations with neighbours

China considers succession to be an internal matter, requiring state approval through historical precedents such as the golden urn (Qing era). Beijing rejects the participation of the exile community, labels the Dalai Lama a ‘separatist’ and plans to install a pro-PRC successor to legitimise its control over Tibet. This is due to fears of separatism and strategic imperatives. In 2025, the president of the Tibet Autonomous Region, Gama Cedain, affirmed the central government's ‘final and indisputable word’ and condemned the exile's statements as interference. Tibetan leaders strongly rejected this statement, considering it interference by an atheist regime in spiritual matters. China's options include accelerating negotiations with the CTA—secret talks have been ongoing through a third country since 2024—but significant progress requires concessions such as recognition of the successor, which is unlikely given the CTA's refusal to dissolve or abandon autonomy. In the absence of an agreement, Beijing could back its own candidate, intensifying the battle for legitimacy. The precedent of the Panchen Lama, with China's appointee in 1995 facing off against the Dalai Lama's choice, who remains missing, portends a dual claim (Wang, 2022; Xu, 2025; China Institute of International Studies, 2023).

Relations with India are tense; Delhi supports the Dalai Lama's autonomy and has hosted exiles since 1959. Border disputes (e.g., the 2020 clashes in the LAC) are intertwined with Tibet, as seen in Tawang (birthplace of the sixth Dalai Lama). India's recent comments on succession highlight the risks to bilateral relations, which could influence normalisation efforts. Bhutan maintains discreet relations, avoiding offence to China and sharing cultural ties, and is likely to remain on the sidelines due to historical rivalries. Nepal, under Chinese influence, restricts Tibetan activities and passively aligns itself with Beijing. Mongolia reveres the Dalai Lama but maintains a balance with economic ties to the People's Republic of China; it could become a “testing ground” for China's control over reincarnation, as warned by the Dalai Lama's envoys, especially after the recognition of Jetsun Dhampa in 2023.

In the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), Sinicisation is intensifying, with infrastructure such as dams on the Yarlung Tsangpo (Brahmaputra), which are causing concern in riverside areas (Stobdan, 2019; Anand, 2023). After 1959, relations hardened; India's “one China” policy recognises Tibet as part of the People's Republic of China but supports cultural preservation.

Recent changes include US legislation (the Tibet Resolution Act of 2024) calling for dialogue. Other Buddhist nations such as Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Japan are acting cautiously; Theravada-majority countries welcome occasional visits but prioritise relations with China, while Japan supports human rights (Kumar, 2025; Toichi, 2023; Japanese Institute of International Affairs, 2024).

China's position employs soft power to co-opt Buddhist networks and counter the transnational authority of the Dalai Lama, similar to tensions between state and religion in Iran or Turkey (Nye, 2004; Mandaville, 2001; Woeser, 2018).

Geopolitical and strategic importance of Tibet for the People's Republic of China

Tibet's status as the “roof of the world” makes it a place of vital geopolitical importance for China. As Xi Jinping's “armoured shield”, it protects the western border and acts as a buffer between the heart of Han territory and India. Known as the ‘third pole’ or ‘roof of the world’, the plateau has an average altitude of between 3,000 and 4,000 metres and is mostly located within the People's Republic of China, with margins in India and Bhutan. It is bordered to the south by the Himalayas (including Everest) and to the north by the Kunlun Mountains, which connect to Xinjiang, and is the source of Asia's major rivers: the Yangtze, the Yellow River (crucial to Chinese geopolitics), the Brahmaputra, the Mekong, the Irrawaddy, the Indus, the Salween and the Sutlej. Control gives Beijing influence over the countries downstream: Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam oppose the Mekong dams because of their impact on energy, agriculture, water and defence. Glacial melt is threatening ecosystems, and the United States is exploiting discontent to counter China (Eyler, 2019; Hirsch, 2025).

For strategist Zhang Wenmu, Tibet provides land access to the resources of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, which is in line with expansion on the periphery of India (Pakistan, Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Sri Lanka) via the China-Pakistan Corridor, avoiding the Strait of Malacca, which is patrolled by the United States. The Himalayas act as a natural wall preventing invasions; rival control would expose China's core (Zhang, 2010; China Institutes of Contemporary International, 2023).

Mega-dams, such as the Yarlung Tsangpo project (the world's largest, with 300 TWh per year, approved in December 2024 and construction of which began in July 2025), boost renewable energy (tripling the Three Gorges) and serve as “water bombs” in disputes. At a cost of more than $160 billion, it reinforces China's hydroelectric dominance (421 GW installed) in a context of coal reduction (60% of the energy mix). Downstream fears include diversion of flow or flooding, as expressed by the minister of Arunachal Pradesh in India. China's south-north water transfer project raises similar concerns. In the Mekong (upper Lancang basin), there are ten dams in operation and nine more planned by 2030, financing projects in Laos (46 dams, 54 planned) and Myanmar. Laos aspires to become Asia's “battery”, but the dams cause droughts (including the worst in decades in 2020), alter the colour of the river and devastate fishing (a £17 billion industry), agriculture and ecosystems that support 60 million people. Studies (Eyes on Earth, 2020) blame Chinese management for holding back water despite heavy rainfall, which has drawn criticism from the United States and regional forums such as the Mekong River Commission (MRC) and the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation (LMC). Cambodia halted dam construction for a decade in 2020; Thailand proposed joint studies (Grundy-Warr & Lin, 2020; Hirsch & Jensen, 2006; Lebel et al., 2005).

From a geopolitical perspective, the dams are intertwined with rivalries between China and India, including territorial disputes and the Quad alliances. Instability in Tibet carries the risk of unrest, but economic development (despite poverty) aims to secure loyalty. For China, Tibet is non-negotiable for national unity, energy security and regional hegemony, with sinicisation through Han migration, Mandarin education and re-education camps. US sanctions (July 2020) highlight Tibet's soft power role in US-China rivalry (Dai, 2022; China Institute of International Studies, 2023).

Culturally, this control uses religion as a weapon to gain legitimacy, eroding the transnational authority of the Dalai Lama and paralleling historical imperial uses of faith for territorial consolidation (Agnew, 2010; Woeser, 2018; McGranahan, 2010).

Conclusion

The succession of the Dalai Lama encapsulates the enduring tensions between spiritual sovereignty and state power. Rooted in the deep legacy of Buddhism, Tibetan traditions face existential threats from the policies of the People's Republic of China, but global alliances offer them resilience.

A balanced analysis reveals no simple solutions; Tibet's claims to independence are based on historical autonomy but are countered by China's discourse of integration. Future stability requires dialogue and respect for religious freedoms amid geopolitical realities. In August 2025, with China's firm stance on reincarnation and regional responses ranging from indifference to vulnerability, the issue remains a flashpoint for India-China relations and Asian security more broadly (Anand, 2023; Panda and Pankaj, 2023; Xu, 2025; China Institute of International Studies, 2023).

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