Introduction

China's economic rise in the 21st century is one of the most transformative phenomena in the global economy, challenging traditional categories of socialism and capitalism. This hybrid model, characterised by powerful state intervention combined with market dynamism, has captured the attention of academics and analysts around the world. Keyu Jin, professor of economics at the London School of Economics (LSE), is a leading voice in this debate thanks to her bicultural perspective and her ability to translate the complexities of the Chinese system to a global audience. In her book The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism (2023), Jin proposes a reinterpretation of the Chinese economic model, highlighting three fundamental pillars: robust state capacity, competitive decentralisation that she calls the ‘mayor economy,’ and an innovative boom led by a new generation of entrepreneurs. Her approach, which combines academic analysis with accessible storytelling, is complemented by her contributions to platforms such as the Lex Fridman podcast (2025), where she explores topics such as technology sanctions, the state-enterprise relationship, and China's demographic challenges.

This monograph offers a critical and comprehensive analysis of Jin's thinking, placing it in an interdisciplinary dialogue with renowned scholars who have studied Asian and global economic development. These include Jostein Hauge, Barry Naughton, Dani Rodrik, Alice Amsden, Dwight Perkins, Joseph Stiglitz, Justin Yifu Lin, Ha-Joon Chang, Masahiko Aoki, T.J. Cheng, Gregory C. Chow, and Korean economists such as Atul Kohli and Byung-Nak Song. Each contributes complementary or critical perspectives on the Chinese model, enriching the analysis with historical, institutional and comparative approaches.

In addition, the case of South Korea is explored in depth as a model of late industrialisation that sheds light on the dynamics of Chinese development, and concrete examples are incorporated to illustrate the arguments.

The text is organised into seven sections:

(1) Keyu Jin's conceptual framework;

(2) her academic output;

(3) a detailed analysis of her contribution to the Lex Fridman podcast;

(4) a comparison with Hauge, Naughton, Rodrik, Amsden, Perkins, Stiglitz, Lin, Chang, Aoki, T.J. Cheng and Chow;

(5) an expanded analysis of Korean economists;

(6) the case of South Korea as a comparative reference; and

(7) a critical assessment of Jin's contributions and limitations.

1. Keyu Jin's thinking: a reinterpretation of the Chinese model

Keyu Jin offers a fresh take on Chinese economic development, arguing that its success cannot be explained through the traditional lenses of socialism or capitalism. In The New China Playbook (2023), Jin identifies three key elements that underpin the Chinese model:

1) exceptional state capacity;

2) competitive decentralisation that fosters innovation at the local level; and

3) a technological boom driven by a young and entrepreneurial generation.

These elements, according to Jin, have enabled China to transform its economy since Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 1978 to become the world's second-largest economy, with a GDP of $18 trillion in 2022.

1.1. Exceptional state capacity

State capacity, according to Jin, is the backbone of the Chinese model. Despite the fragility of its formal institutions compared to advanced economies such as the United States or Japan, the Chinese government has demonstrated a unique ability to implement strategic macroeconomic policies. A prime example is the high-speed rail network, which reached 45,000 kilometres in 2023, connecting 93% of Chinese cities with more than 500,000 inhabitants and reducing travel time between Beijing and Shanghai from 12 to 4 hours. Another flagship project is the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macao Bridge, a $20 billion infrastructure project connecting three key economic regions, facilitating intraregional trade and consolidating the economic integration of the Pearl River Delta region (Jin, 2023, p. 50). Jin contrasts this state capacity with what she perceives as its erosion in Western countries:

‘China has strong state capacity and weak institutions, whereas advanced countries like the United States have strong formal institutions but state capacity is gradually eroding’ (Jin, 2023, p. 45).

1.2. Competitive decentralisation that fosters local innovation

The second pillar, the “mayors” economy', describes a system of competitive decentralisation in which local governments compete to implement innovative policies, attracting investment and fostering economic growth. Shenzhen, which grew from a fishing village in the 1970s to a global technology hub with a GDP of $460 billion in 2022, is an iconic example of this model. Thanks to tax incentives and public-private partnerships, Shenzhen attracted tech giants such as Huawei and Tencent, which generated combined revenues of $200 billion in 2022. Similarly, in Hangzhou, the local government supported the development of the Yuhang Technology Park, which fuelled the growth of Alibaba, a company that achieved revenues of $130 billion in 2022 (Jin, 2023, pp. 127-130). This approach of local experimentation, according to Jin, allows China to adapt its policies to specific regional contexts, generating economic dynamism that contrasts with more centralised systems.

1.3. Technological boom driven by a young and entrepreneurial generation

The third pillar is the boom in technological innovation, led by a new generation of entrepreneurs. Jin challenges the perception of China as a mere technological imitator, highlighting companies such as ByteDance, which, founded in 2012, reached a valuation of $400 billion in 2023 thanks to its artificial intelligence algorithms that have transformed platforms such as TikTok, with 1.5 billion global users. Another example is DJI, the world leader in the drone market, which controls 70% of the global market and generated revenue of $4 billion in 2022 through innovations in camera technology and software. In addition, Pinduoduo has revolutionised e-commerce with its group buying model, generating $20 billion in revenue in 2022 by directly connecting agricultural producers with urban consumers (Jin, 2023, p. 245). These examples illustrate how China has gone from being a technology follower to a global innovator, driven by a young generation educated in a context of growing investment in higher education.

1.4. Why Jin's perspective deserves attention

Jin's bicultural perspective, shaped by her upbringing in Beijing, her education at Harvard and her experience at institutions such as the World Bank and the China Banking Regulatory Commission, enables him to offer analysis that combines a deep understanding of Chinese culture and the Chinese political system with a Western analytical framework.

On the Lex Fridman podcast, Jin explains this advantage:

‘Having grown up in China and studied in the West, I can explain why Chinese policymakers make decisions that seem puzzling to outsiders’ (Fridman, 2025, 10:45).

For example, Jin highlights how Confucian culture fosters a collective approach that is reflected in the high savings rate of Chinese households (30% of disposable income in 2022), which drives investment in property to ensure intergenerational security, contributing to a £4 trillion real estate market. However, this same dynamic has fuelled a real estate bubble, with companies such as Evergrande accumulating debts of $300 billion, a challenge that Jin addresses with some optimism, but which other academics analyse with greater caution.

The historical context of Deng Xiaoping's reforms in 1978 is fundamental to understanding Jin's analysis. These reforms, which included the collectivisation of agriculture, the opening up to foreign investment and the creation of special economic zones, laid the foundations for China's economic growth. Township and village enterprises generated 28 million jobs in the 1980s, contributing 20% of China's industrial GDP and producing consumer goods such as household appliances that boosted exports to Asian and European markets. The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone, for example, attracted $200 billion in foreign investment between 1980 and 2020, transforming itself into a technology hub that is home to companies such as Huawei, Tencent and DJI (Jin, 2023, pp. 22-25). This pragmatic approach, tailored to the Chinese context, resonates with the ideas of Justin Yifu Lin, who emphasises the importance of “contextual” policies for economic development (Lin, 2012, p. 150).

2. Keyu Jin's academic output

Jin's academic output complements her narrative in The New China Playbook, providing technical and empirical analysis to support her arguments. In her article ‘China's Financial System and Economic Growth’ (2019), published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Jin examines how the Chinese financial system, despite its opacity and the presence of shadow banks, has been a key driver of economic growth. For example, state-owned banks channelled $2.5 trillion into infrastructure projects between 2010 and 2020, including the Beijing Daxing International Airport, which opened in 2019 with an investment of $11 billion. However, this strategy has increased local debt to 35 trillion yuan in 2022, a challenge that Jin acknowledges, but which other academics, such as Gregory C. Chow, address with greater emphasis on its risks (Jin, 2019, p. 90).

In ‘Entrepreneurship and State Capacity in China’ (2021), co-authored with Calvin Li and published in the NBER Working Paper Series, Jin analyses how the Chinese state encourages entrepreneurship through selective policies. One example is Huawei, which received £65 billion in state funding between 2008 and 2022, enabling it to lead the 5G telecommunications market, with revenues of $120 billion in 2022 and the installation of 3,000 base stations worldwide. This state support, according to Jin, illustrates the Chinese government's ability to boost strategic sectors, although it does not fully address the risks of technological dependence, an issue criticised by other academics such as Hauge and Chang (Jin & Li, 2021, p. 12).

In ‘Global Trade Imbalances and China's Role’ (2022), published in the International Economic Review, Jin highlights China's transition to a domestic demand-driven model, with domestic consumption reaching 55% of GDP in 2022, driven by a middle class of 400 million people. E-commerce, led by platforms such as JD.com, generated $1.5 trillion in sales in 2022, with events such as ‘Double 11’ generating $150 billion in a single day. This shift reflects China's ability to adapt to global dynamics, a point that Jin connects to Dani Rodrik's ideas about the need to balance trade openness with domestic policies (Jin, 2022, p. 460; Rodrik, 2006).

3. Lex Fridman's podcast: a window into Jin's thinking

Keyu Jin's conversation with Lex Fridman in 2025 provides an accessible platform to explore the themes of The New China Playbook, revealing both the strengths of her analysis and some of its limitations. Jin addresses the technological sanctions imposed by the United States, such as the CHIPS Act, which restricts China's access to advanced technologies. She argues that these sanctions have accelerated China's technological self-sufficiency, with $180 billion invested in semiconductor research and development between 2018 and 2023. One example is SMIC, which produced 7 nm chips for Huawei's Mate 60 smartphone in 2023, a significant breakthrough, although it still depends on Dutch lithography equipment (ASML) for 5 nm chips. This dependence limited the production of 5G devices by companies such as Xiaomi, which experienced a 10% drop in technology exports in 2022 (Fridman, 2025, 1:16:56). Although Jin presents this process as a strength, she does not address the short-term costs in depth, an aspect that economists such as Hauge and Chow criticise.

Regarding the state-business relationship, Jin highlights the flexibility of the Chinese model, which combines state control with business autonomy. She cites the case of Alibaba, whose valuation reached $700 billion in 2020 before facing fines of $2.8 billion in 2021 for monopolistic practices, and Tencent, which generated $80 billion in revenue in 2022, but faced regulations to limit the time minors can spend playing video games, affecting its gaming division, which accounts for 30% of its revenue. These examples illustrate the balance between growth and state intervention, but they also reflect the tensions arising from the Chinese Communist Party's control, an issue that Jin addresses with optimism, but which other scholars, such as Minxin Pei, analyse with greater scepticism (Fridman, 2025, 58:25; Pei, 2016, p. 80).

Jin also explores the impact of Confucian culture on the Chinese economy, highlighting how it encourages a high savings rate (30% of disposable income in 2022). This mindset has fuelled the real estate market, which reached $4 trillion, but has also contributed to the debt crisis of companies such as Evergrande, with liabilities of $300 billion. Jin sees technological innovation as a solution to demographic challenges, such as the ageing population resulting from the one-child policy (1979-2015), which has left 14% of the population over the age of 65 in 2022. She cites the case of Ping An Healthcare, which served 400 million users in 2022 using artificial intelligence, as an example of how technology can mitigate these problems. However, she does not address the fiscal impact, which could require a 20% increase in public spending on pensions by 2030, according to IMF estimates (Fridman, 2025, 1:05:12).

Finally, Jin addresses regional inequality, with Shanghai's GDP per capita ($22,000) tripling that of Gansu ($7,000). She highlights the development of Chengdu, which attracted $200 billion in technology investment in 2022 thanks to the Chengdu Hi-Tech Zone, but does not delve into the social tensions arising from this inequality, such as protests in rural regions over lack of access to basic services (Fridman, 2025, 45:30). The podcast reveals Jin's ability to communicate complex ideas, but her optimism may downplay structural challenges, a point that other scholars address in greater depth.

Nevertheless, this episode of Fridman's podcast with Jin is well worth watching and paying attention to. For this reason, I am reviewing and commenting on it, as well as including the link so that you can watch it carefully.

4. Interdisciplinary dialogue: comparing Jin with Asian and global economists

Jin's thinking is enriched by placing him in dialogue with economists who have studied Asian and global economic development, offering complementary and critical perspectives. This comparison is explored below, with a broader focus on Gregory C. Chow and Korean economists.

4.1. Jostein Hauge and Alice Amsden

Jostein Hauge, in The Future of the Factory (2023) and ‘China's Industrial Policy and Its Implications for Global Value Chains’ (2020), analyses Chinese industrial policies from a critical perspective, drawing inspiration from Alice Amsden.

In Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation (1989), Amsden argues that South Korea’s success was due to ‘reciprocal control mechanisms’, where the government demanded results in exchange for subsidies. For example, Samsung received state loans to develop semiconductors, achieving 20% of the global market by 2022. Hauge applies this framework to China, highlighting that $150 billion in subsidies for artificial intelligence between 2017 and 2022 have boosted companies such as Baidu, but have also generated inefficiencies, such as the overproduction of solar panels (50% excess capacity in 2022) and abandoned projects in Yunnan, with debts of 10 trillion yuan (Hauge, 2020, p. 350). Unlike Jin, Hauge emphasises the risks of competitive decentralisation, such as local corruption, while Jin sees this model as a driver of innovation.

4.2. Barry Naughton and Dwight Perkins

Barry Naughton, in The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (2018), and Dwight Perkins, in ‘Completing China's Move to the Market’ (1994), contextualise Chinese development since Deng Xiaoping's reforms.

Perkins highlights China's gradual approach, such as municipal and village enterprises, which produced household appliances and generated 20% of industrial GDP in the 1980s. Naughton emphasises how special economic zones attracted $1.2 trillion in foreign investment between 1978 and 2010, transforming cities such as Shenzhen and Pudong (Naughton, 2018, p. 112). Both are more cautious than Jin about challenges such as population ageing (14% over 65 in 2022) and local debt (35 trillion yuan in 2022), issues that Jin addresses with optimism.

4.3. Dani Rodrik

Dani Rodrik, in ‘What's So Special about China's Exports?’ (2006), argues that China's export success is due to tailored industrial policies, such as subsidies to Foxconn, which employs 1 million workers. In Making Room for China in the World Economy (2010), Rodrik advocates balancing trade openness with the protection of national interests, a point that Jin shares when analysing trade sanctions (Rodrik, 2006, p. 5; Rodrik, 2010, p. 90). However, Rodrik is more critical of export dependence, suggesting that China should prioritise domestic demand, a process that Jin considers to be underway (Jin, 2022, p. 460).

4.4. Joseph Stiglitz

Joseph Stiglitz, in Globalization and Its Discontents (2002), criticises neoliberal policies, highlighting how China resisted full liberalisation through capital controls that stabilised its financial market in 2008. Jin shares this view, citing subsidies to technology companies that generated $300 billion in exports in 2022 (Stiglitz, 2002, p. 120; Jin, 2023, p. 85). Stiglitz addresses regional inequalities, an issue that Jin touches on but does not explore in depth.

4.5. Justin Yifu Lin

Justin Yifu Lin, in Demystifying the Chinese Economy (2012), argues that China's success lies in its “pragmatic” approach.

He cites special economic zones, which attracted $1.2 trillion in foreign investment, and the increase in university enrolment from 1 million in 1998 to 8 million in 2022. Lin is more critical than Jin on technological dependence, such as 5 nm chips, a point that resonates with Hauge (Lin, 2012, p. 150).

4.6. Masahiko Aoki

Masahiko Aoki, in The Chinese Economy: A New Transition (2012), highlights competitive decentralisation in China, such as the Shanghai stock market, with a capitalisation of $7 trillion in 2022. However, he warns about local corruption, such as the Chongqing scandal in 2012, where officials embezzled 1 billion yuan in infrastructure projects (Aoki, 2012, p. 125). Aoki agrees with Jin on the importance of decentralisation, but emphasises the need for strong institutions.

4.7. T.J. Cheng

T.J. Cheng, in ‘The Political Economy of Taiwan's Development into the 21st Century’ (1999), analyses how Taiwan supported TSMC, which generated $70 billion in revenue in 2022. He applies this framework to China, highlighting Shenzhen, but warns of corruption in Guizhou, where redundant projects generated debts of 500 billion yuan (Cheng, 1999, p. 50). Cheng shares Jin's emphasis on decentralisation, but agrees with Hauge and Aoki in highlighting institutional risks.

4.8. Gregory C. Chow: a critical perspective from within

Gregory C. Chow, a Chinese-American economist and professor emeritus at Princeton, is a key figure in the analysis of Chinese economic development, known for his ‘Chow test’ and his work as an advisor to governments in China and Taiwan. In China’s Economic Transformation (2015), Chow argues that China’s success is due to a combination of market reforms and state-directed industrial policies. For example, price liberalisation in the 1980s allowed companies such as Haier to transform themselves from a manufacturer of basic household appliances into a global competitor, with revenues of $50 billion in 2022, challenging brands such as Whirlpool. Chow also highlights the role of competitive decentralisation, citing the case of Suzhou, which attracted $100 billion in foreign investment in electronics between 2000 and 2020, becoming a hub for companies such as Apple and Samsung (Chow, 2015, p. 120).

In Economic Reform and Growth in China (2004), Chow delves deeper into Deng Xiaoping's reforms, highlighting the de-collectivisation of agriculture, which increased grain production by 30% between 1978 and 1984, and the creation of special economic zones, which attracted $1.2 trillion in foreign investment between 1978 and 2010. These reforms enabled cities such as Pudong in Shanghai to transform themselves into global financial centres, with a stock market that reached a capitalisation of $7 trillion in 2022. Chow also highlights investment in education, with $300 billion allocated to higher education between 2010 and 2022, resulting in 8 million university graduates per year (Chow, 2004, p. 130).

However, Chow is more critical than Jin about structural challenges. In Corruption and China’s Economic Reform in the Early 21st Century (2005), he analyses how corruption has hampered development, citing the 2012 Chongqing scandal, where officials embezzled 1 billion yuan in infrastructure projects. Chow also highlights the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises, which control 40% of industrial assets but generate only 20% of GDP. For example, PetroChina, with revenues of $400 billion in 2022, faces bureaucratic problems that limit its competitiveness against private companies such as Sinopec (Chow, 2015, p. 130).

In addition, Chow addresses regional inequality, with Shanghai's GDP per capita ($22,000) tripling that of Gansu ($7,000), and the need to reform the financial system to reduce local debt, which reached 35 trillion yuan in 2022. These points contrast with Jin's optimism, who tends to downplay these challenges, and align with the concerns of Hauge, Aoki and T.J. Cheng about institutional fragility (Chow, 2005, p. 10; Hauge, 2020, p. 345; Aoki, 2012, p. 125; Cheng, 1999, p. 50).

4.9. Korean economists: Ha-Joon Chang, Atul Kohli and Byung-Nak Song

Korean economists Ha-Joon Chang, Atul Kohli and Byung-Nak Song offer complementary perspectives on Asian economic development, with a focus on the role of the state and industrial policies, which enrich Jin and Chow's analysis of China.

Ha-Joon Chang, in Kicking Away the Ladder (2002), argues that Asian countries achieved industrialisation through protectionist and state interventionist policies. For example, the Chinese government protected its automotive industry, allowing BYD to become a world leader in electric vehicles, with 1.8 million units produced in 2022 and a 20% global market share. In 23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism (2010), Chang highlights the success of Huawei's 5G network, which generated $50 billion in exports in 2022, but warns of inefficiencies, such as steel overproduction (1 billion tonnes in 2022), which led to losses of $50 billion. Chang shares Jin's recognition of state intervention, but agrees with Chow in highlighting the risks of inefficiency and corruption (Chang, 2002, p. 45; Chang, 2010, p. 120; Chang, 2016, p. 95).

Atul Kohli, in State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global Periphery (2004), analyses how South Korea, China, India and Brazil managed to industrialise through state-directed policies. In South Korea, the government supported conglomerates (chaebols) such as Samsung and Hyundai, which received state loans and subsidies, generating 20% and 10% of South Korea's GDP in 2022, respectively. For example, the government invested $10 billion in the 1980s to support the semiconductor industry, enabling Samsung to dominate 40% of the global DRAM memory market in 2022. Kohli applies this framework to China, highlighting the $50 billion in subsidies to the semiconductor industry between 2015 and 2022, which have boosted companies such as SMIC. However, he warns that the lack of democratic institutions in China, unlike South Korea after 1987, creates risks of corruption, such as redundant projects in Henan, which operate at 30% of their capacity and generated debts of 1 trillion yuan (Kohli, 2004, p. 120). Kohli agrees with Jin on the importance of state intervention, but shares Chow's concerns about the need for strong institutions.

Byung-Nak Song, in The Rise of the Korean Economy (2003), analyses how South Korea combined industrial policies with market incentives to transform its economy. The government supported POSCO, the country's largest steel company, with $5 billion in subsidies in the 1970s, enabling South Korea to become the world's fifth largest steel producer, with 40 million tonnes in 2022. Song also highlights investment in education, with 10% of GDP allocated to training 5 million university graduates between 1970 and 2000. Applying this framework to China, Song cites the development of Guangzhou, which attracted £150 billion in automotive investment between 2000 and 2020, boosting brands such as GAC Group, which produced 2 million vehicles in 2022. However, Song warns of the risks of overinvestment, such as the $50 billion invested in artificial intelligence projects with uncertain returns, a point that resonates with Chow and Hauge (Song, 2003, p. 90; Chow, 2015, p. 130; Hauge, 2020, p. 352).

Comparison with Gregory C. Chow: Chang, Kohli, and Song share with Chow and Jin the recognition of competitive decentralisation and industrial policies as drivers of growth, but differ in their assessment of institutional challenges. Chang and Kohli highlight the inefficiencies of decentralisation in China, such as steel overproduction and redundant projects, while Song emphasises the importance of investment in education, similar to Chow. Chow, with his quantitative approach, offers a technical analysis, citing data such as local debt of 35 trillion yuan and the inefficiency of state-owned enterprises. Jin, on the other hand, takes a more optimistic tone, downplaying these challenges, while Chow, Chang, Kohli and Song advocate institutional reforms to ensure the sustainability of the Chinese model.

5. South Korea as a reference for the study of China

South Korea offers a crucial reference model for understanding China's economic development, given its success as a late industrialising economy. In 1950, South Korea had a GDP per capita of $80; in 2022, it reached $34,000, thanks to state-led industrial policies. Alice Amsden, in Asia's Next Giant (1989), highlights that conglomerates such as Samsung and Hyundai, which generated 20% and 10% of South Korea's GDP in 2022, respectively, were supported with loans and export targets. For example, Samsung received subsidies to develop semiconductors, enabling it to dominate 40% of the global DRAM memory market in 2022 (Amsden, 1989, p. 145). This model shares similarities with Jin's ‘mayors' economy,’ where local Chinese governments encourage innovation.

South Korea faced challenges similar to those of China, such as initial dependence on foreign technologies and the need to accumulate human capital. In the 1980s, Korea invested 10% of its GDP in education, producing 5 million university graduates between 1970 and 2000. China has followed a similar path, allocating $300 billion to higher education between 2010 and 2022, resulting in 8 million graduates per year. However, China faces unique challenges due to its scale (a GDP of $18 trillion compared to South Korea's $1.7 trillion) and its authoritarian political system, which limits business autonomy, as Minxin Pei (2016, p. 80) points out.

China's industrial policies, such as $50 billion in subsidies to the semiconductor industry, reflect strategies similar to those of South Korea, but Hauge warns of inefficiencies, such as the overproduction of solar panels (Hauge, 2020, p. 350).. While South Korea developed strong institutions after its democratisation in 1987, China faces problems such as local debt (35 trillion yuan in 2022), a point that Jin downplays but which Chow, Chang, Kohli and Song address with greater emphasis (Jin, 2023, p. 45).

6. Criticisms and limitations of Jin's thinking

Keyu Jin's analysis, while insightful and perceptive, has limitations that have been pointed out by other scholars and critics. Her optimistic tone tends to downplay structural challenges, such as the real estate bubble, which accounts for 30% of China's GDP, and local debt of 35 trillion yuan in 2022. Foreign Policy (2023) criticises The New China Playbook for underestimating these problems, as well as the political tensions arising from the Chinese Communist Party's control over the private sector, such as sanctions against businessmen like Jack Ma, whose company Alibaba faced fines of $2.8 billion in 2021 (Pei, 2016, p. 80). Hauge, Naughton, Aoki, T.J. Cheng, Chow, Chang, Kohli and Song agree on risks such as overinvestment in sectors such as artificial intelligence ($150 billion between 2017 and 2022) and technological dependence, particularly on semiconductors, where China still relies on foreign equipment (Hauge, 2020, p. 352; Naughton, 2018, p. 200; Aoki, 2012, p. 125; Cheng, 1999, p. 50; Chow, 2015, p. 130).

Jin's bicultural perspective, while extremely valuable and insightful, may oversimplify the political complexities of the Chinese system, an aspect that economists such as Pei address in greater depth. Furthermore, her emphasis on technological innovation and competitive decentralisation does not fully address the risks of regional inequality and social tensions arising from the gap between regions such as Shanghai and Gansu. Nevertheless, it is essential to listen to her, because she provides an interesting insight into certain perspectives that we in the West tend to view with bias, especially since we are in 2025... and perhaps the criticisms that can be levelled at Jin are becoming fewer and fewer, except perhaps for nuances on the state issue, along the lines drawn by Hauge, and a few other things. But her vision is extremely valuable if you are interested in trying to unravel things to get an unbiased view, because China is consolidating things that we thought would take much longer, not to mention the region of East Asia in general and how it fits in with Southeast Asia.

7. Conclusion

Keyu Jin offers an exceptional contribution to the study of the Chinese economy, highlighting its hybrid model that combines state capacity, competitive decentralisation and technological innovation. Her bicultural perspective and ability to communicate complex ideas, as evidenced in The New China Playbook and the Lex Fridman podcast, enrich the debate on Chinese development.

However, her optimism must be balanced with the critical perspectives of economists such as Jostein Hauge, Barry Naughton, Dani Rodrik, Alice Amsden, Dwight Perkins, Joseph Stiglitz, Justin Yifu Lin, Ha-Joon Chang, Masahiko Aoki, T.J. Cheng, Gregory C. Chow, Atul Kohli, and Byung-Nak Song, who highlight the risks of decentralisation, corruption, local debt, and technological dependence.

Interdisciplinary dialogue reveals that while the Chinese model shares similarities with that of South Korea, its scale and political context present unique challenges. Korean economists such as Chang, Kohli, and Song, along with Chow, offer critical perspectives that complement Jin's analysis, underscoring the need for institutional reforms to ensure the sustainability of Chinese growth.

References

Amsden, A. H. (1989). Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialisation. Oxford University Press.

Aoki, M. (1988). Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy. Cambridge University Press.

Aoki, M. (Ed.). (2012). The Chinese Economy: A New Transition. Palgrave Macmillan.

Chang, H.-J. (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspective. Anthem Press.

Chang, H.-J. (2010). 23 Things They Don’t Tell You About Capitalism. Bloomsbury Press.

Chang, H.-J. (2016). Economics: The User’s Guide. Penguin.

Cheng, T. J. (1999). The political economy of Taiwan’s development into the 21st century. Asian Survey, 39(1), 43-62.

Chow, G. C. (2004). Economic reform and growth in China. Annals of Economics and Finance, 5(1), 127-152.

Chow, G. C. (2005). Corruption and China’s economic reform in the early 21st century. Princeton University Working Paper.

Chow, G. C. (2015). China’s Economic Transformation (3rd ed.). Wiley-Blackwell.

Foreign Policy. (2023). Keyu Jin’s New China Playbook review: China’s economy is not exceptional.

Fridman, L. (Host). (2025). Keyu Jin: China’s economy, tariffs, trade, Trump, communism & capitalism [Podcast]. Lex Fridman Podcast, #477. https://youtu.be/y3yAVZk3tyA?si=Yh-CZYA_SH54EYVW

Hauge, J. (2020). China’s industrial policy and its implications for global value chains. Review of International Political Economy, 27(2), 340-362. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2019.1677743

Jin, K. (2019). China’s financial system and economic growth. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 33(4), 85-106. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.33.4.85

Jin, K. (2022). Global trade imbalances and China’s role. International Economic Review, 63(2), 451-478. https://doi.org/10.1111/iere.12543

Jin, K. (2023). The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism. Penguin.

Jin, K., & Li, C. (2021). Entrepreneurship and state capacity in China. NBER Working Paper Series, No. 29032. https://doi.org/10.3386/w29032

Kohli, A. (2004). State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global Periphery. Cambridge University Press.

Lin, J. Y. (2012). Demystifying the Chinese Economy. Cambridge University Press.

Naughton, B. (2018). The Chinese Economy: Transitions and Growth (2nd ed.). MIT Press.

Pei, M. (2016). China’s Crony Capitalism: The Dynamics of Regime Decay. Harvard University Press.

Perkins, D. H. (1994). Completing China’s move to the market. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8(2), 23-46. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.8.2.23

Rodrik, D. (2006). What’s so special about China’s exports? China & World Economy, 14(5), 1-19. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1749-124X.2006.00066.x

Rodrik, D. (2010). Making room for China in the world economy. American Economic Review, 100(2), 89-93. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.100.2.89

Song, B.-N. (2003). The Rise of the Korean Economy (3rd ed.). Oxford University Press.

Stiglitz, J. E. (2002). Globalization and Its Discontents. W.W. Norton & Company.

Share this article
The link has been copied!