Russia's Shadow Fleet is a sophisticated maritime system designed to circumvent international sanctions imposed after the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. This mechanism, which allows Russia to maintain the flow of its energy exports and other sanctioned goods, has transformed global maritime trade by operating outside international regulations. Inspired by similar strategies used by Iran and Venezuela, the Russian Shadow Fleet stands out for its scale, complexity and state backing, making it a strategic tool for sustaining the Russian economy and, according to some analysts, financing its war effort. In this analysis, I delve into the nature of this fleet, the goods it transports beyond liquefied natural gas (LNG) and DAP phosphates, the operational methods it employs, the final destinations of its products, the stopovers and exchanges of goods in international waters, and an exhaustive comparison with the fleets of Iran and Venezuela, examining how Russia has been inspired by them and in what ways it surpasses them.

This document is a necessary extension of this piece published here.

What is Russia's Shadow Fleet?

The Russian Shadow Fleet is a network of ships, mainly oil tankers and gas carriers, operating under opaque conditions to transport sanctioned goods, especially crude oil and petroleum products, evading the price cap of $60 per barrel set by the G7, the European Union and Australia, among others, in December 2022 (Kyiv School of Economics [KSE], 2024; Perragin & Renouard, 2024). According to recent estimates, this fleet has grown from approximately 600 vessels in 2022 to between 1,100 and 1,400 in 2023, of which 435 are crude oil tankers, representing 16% of the global tanker fleet (KSE, 2024; Brookings, 2025). These ships, with an average age of 16 to 20 years, are often at the end of their useful life, making them cheaper to acquire but also more prone to accidents and spills (Windward, 2025; Atlantic Council, 2024).

According to Russian-language sources, the ghost fleet comprises between 300 and 850 tankers, many of them managed from India, China or the United Arab Emirates (Russian author, 2025). The total estimated number is between 1,100 and 1,400 vessels by the end of 2023, of which 435 are oil tankers, accounting for around 16% of the global fleet (OCCRP, 2025).

The fleet is divided into two main categories:

1) The dark fleet, which operates covertly by disabling automatic identification systems (AIS), falsifying location data or carrying out ship-to-ship transfers (STS) on the high seas; and

2) The grey fleet, which maintains a façade of legality through registration with shell companies but engages in sanctioned activities (Windward, 2025). These vessels are often registered under flags of convenience in countries with lax regulations, such as Panama, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, Gabon or the Cook Islands, and are managed by companies with opaque ownership structures in jurisdictions such as the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong or the Seychelles (War Sanctions, 2025). A case in point is Nikhil Ganesh Ghorpade, a photojournalist with no experience in the energy sector, who is registered as the nominal director of a company operating ships in the Shadow Fleet, illustrating the complexity of these networks in concealing real owners (The Japan Times, 2024; OCCRP, 2025).

The main purpose of the Shadow Fleet is to ensure that Russia can continue to export its energy resources and other goods despite sanctions, generating critical revenue. In 2023, the fleet is estimated to have transported 70% of Russian crude oil exported by sea (4.1 million barrels per day in June 2024), representing nearly 90% of crude oil sold by sea (Le Monde, 2024)and 38% of petroleum products, such as diesel and gasoline, allowing Russia to sell oil above the price cap, reaching $74.98 per barrel for Urals crude in April 2024 (KSE, 2024; Meduza, 2024). This revenue stream, which according to the Centre for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) generated more than $5 billion annually, is crucial to sustaining the Russian economy and, according to some analysts, financing its war machine in Ukraine (Infobae, 2025).

Goods transported by the Shadow Fleet

The Russian Shadow Fleet is not limited to transporting liquefied natural gas (LNG) and DAP phosphates, but covers a wide range of sanctioned and strategic goods, adapting to the needs of the illicit market. Below, I detail the main products transported, backed by reliable sources:

1. Crude oil and petroleum products: The core of the Shadow Fleet's operations is the transport of crude oil, which accounts for 90% of Russian maritime exports of crude oil (196 tankers loaded in November 2024) and 36% of petroleum products, such as diesel, gasoline and kerosene (KSE, 2024; Infobae, 2025). In 2023, Russia exported 2.1 million barrels of crude oil per day to China, accounting for 19% of Chinese imports, much of which travelled on Shadow Fleet vessels (MDPI, 2025). Ports such as Fujairah (United Arab Emirates) and certain Turkish ports are key hubs for the blending and re-export of Russian oil, disguising its origin to circumvent sanctions (Perragin & Renouard, 2025). Its main destinations are China and India, while Turkey acts as a platform for refining and re-exporting products to the European Union (Le Monde, 2024; Perragin & Renouard, 2025).

2. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and coal: Since 2024, Russia has expanded its fleet to include ships transporting LNG, especially from the Arctic LNG 2 project, valued at $21 billion. Of the approximately 50 vessels dedicated to LNG, nine have been identified as part of the Shadow Fleet, mainly registered in the United Arab Emirates and India (Oxford Analytica, 2024).

These vessels supply Asian markets, such as China and India, offsetting the reduction in LNG consumption in the EU following the EU's 14th package of sanctions in 2024, which bans the re-export of Russian LNG to third countries (The Japan Times, 2024).

3. DAP phosphates and other fertilisers: Russia is a world leader in fertiliser exports, accounting for 16% of global urea exports and 12% of phosphate exports in 2020 (USDA, 2023). DAP (diammonium phosphate) phosphates, which are essential for agriculture, are transported by the Shadow Fleet to circumvent sanctions, especially to countries such as Brazil, India and China. Although there is no evidence that DAP phosphates are transported exclusively by this fleet, fertilisers in general are part of Russian exports facilitated by sanctioned vessels (USDA, 2023; War Sanctions, 2025). In 2023, Russia imposed fertilizer export quotas to prioritise its domestic market, but the Shadow Fleet has allowed these exports to continue despite the restrictions (USDA, 2023).

4. Stolen agricultural products: The Shadow Fleet transports agricultural products, such as wheat and other grains, from occupied Ukrainian territories, such as Crimea and Donbas. These goods are sold to generate revenue and maintain relations with allies such as Iran and North Korea. For example, in March 2025, a Shadow Fleet vessel called at the port of Kamysh-Burun in occupied Ukraine to load agricultural products (War Sanctions, 2025). This illicit trade not only finances Russia, but also destabilises global food security, given that Ukraine is a key supplier of grain (Atlantic Council, 2024).

5. Weapons and dual-use goods: The Shadow Fleet transports weapons, drone components and dual-use goods (with civilian and military applications) from Iran to Russia in exchange for oil. Companies such as Crios Shipping LLC have been sanctioned for these activities, suggesting that the fleet has a strategic role beyond energy trade (War Sanctions, 2025). These goods are critical to Russia's war machine, including the production of drones and missiles used in Ukraine (Infobae, 2025).

6. Coal and other natural resources: Although oil and LNG are the main goods, the Shadow Fleet also transports coal and other sanctioned natural resources, following patterns similar to those used by Iran and Venezuela (Windward, 2025). The fleet's versatility allows Russia to adapt to the demands of the illicit market, maximising its revenues.

Operating methods of the Shadow Fleet

The Russian Shadow Fleet employs sophisticated tactics to evade sanctions and international monitoring, making it a formidable challenge for maritime authorities. These strategies, refined from the experiences of Iran and Venezuela, combine technology, legal subterfuge and state support. Below, I detail the main methods, backed by academic and journalistic sources:

1. Deactivation of the Automatic Identification System (AIS), or blackouts: Dark fleet vessels frequently deactivate their AIS to avoid being tracked, especially in strategic areas such as the Kerch Strait, the Black Sea, the Baltic Sea and the South Atlantic. For example, the Panamanian-flagged vessel Eventin deactivated its AIS in 2025 while operating in the Black Sea and was detected adrift near the island of Rügen, Germany, after losing power, leading to its seizure by German authorities (War Sanctions, 2025; Euronews, 2025). This practice, known as ‘blackouts,’ is common in areas conducive to smuggling, such as the Gulf of Laconia (Greece) and the Gulf of Oman (DFRLab, 2024).

2. Ship-to-Ship Transfers (STS): Cargo transfers at sea are a key tactic for concealing the origin of oil, LNG or other goods. Ships carry out STS in strategic locations, such as the Gulf of Laconia, the Gulf of Oman, Ceuta, Malta and the South Atlantic, mixing Russian oil with crude from other sources to disguise its origin (DFRLab, 2024; Nuestromar, 2023). For example, a Cameroonian-flagged oil tanker was detected in October 2022 loitering in Cape Verdean waters, increasing its draught from 7.5 to 12 metres without recording any port calls, indicating an STS transfer, before unloading in Turkey (Nuestromar, 2023). These operations have allowed Russia to sell oil above the price cap, reaching £74.98 per barrel in April 2024 (Meduza, 2024).

3. Convenience flags and ‘flag hopping’: Ships operate under the flags of countries with weak regulations, such as Panama, Liberia, Gabon, the Cook Islands or the Marshall Islands. In 2023, Gabon doubled its ship registry, with 98% considered high risk due to a lack of identifiable owners. In addition, ships frequently change flags (‘flag hopping’) to avoid sanctions. For example, the oil tanker Jaguar, sanctioned by the EU, sailed under the Gabonese flag before changing to another flag in 2025 (Naucher, 2025).

4. Opaque ownership structures: The fleet uses shell companies in jurisdictions such as the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, the Seychelles and Dubai to hide real owners. Companies such as Voliton DMCC, Bellatrix Energy Limited and Covart Energy Limited have been sanctioned for managing ships in the Shadow Fleet (War Sanctions, 2025). Many of these companies are created specifically to operate one or two ships, and their nominal directors, as in the case of Nikhil Ganesh Ghorpade, lack experience in the maritime sector (The Japan Times, 2024). In addition, ships that previously belonged to Sovcomflot, the Russian state-owned company, were transferred to companies in the United Arab Emirates to hide their origin (Geopolitical Monitor, 2025).

5. Unregulated or non-existent insurance: Two-thirds of the Shadow Fleet vessels operate with ‘unknown’ insurance or insurance provided by sanctioned Russian companies, such as Ingosstrakh or AlfaStrakhovanie, or by companies in countries such as Cameroon and Kyrgyzstan (Ukrainian Energy, 2024). For example, the Norwegian company Ro Marine cancelled insurance for three oil tankers in December 2023 after discovering that they were transporting sanctioned Russian oil, and false Ro Marine documents have been used to deceive NATO countries. This increases the risk of accidents, as the ships do not comply with Western protection and indemnity (P&I) club standards (KSE, 2024).

6. Use of intermediate ports for cargo “laundering”: Ports such as Fujairah (United Arab Emirates), Kozmino (Russia), and certain ports in Turkey and Malta serve as hubs for blending and re-exporting Russian oil as unsanctioned product. For example, Turkey increased its purchases of Russian oil by 105% between 2023 and 2024, while its fuel exports to the EU grew by 107%, suggesting that Russian oil is being refined and re-exported (Meduza, 2024). Companies such as Turkey-based Beks Ship Management have been singled out for transporting oil from Kozmino to India and China (El Confidencial, 2023).

7. Military escort: Since June 2025, the Russian Navy has begun escorting Shadow Fleet convoys, such as the ships Selva and Sierra, sanctioned by the United Kingdom and the EU, which were protected by the Steregushchiy-class corvette Boykiy while transiting the English Channel. This direct military support, which includes warships and Su-35 fighter jets, as in the incident in Estonian waters in May 2025, reflects a level of state commitment not seen in the fleets of Iran or Venezuela (Naucher, 2025).

8. GNSS manipulation: Shadow Fleet vessels manipulate satellite navigation systems (GNSS) to falsify their locations, a practice detected in the South Atlantic, the Black Sea and the Alboran Sea. For example, the oil tanker Kapitan Schemilkin sailed in circles in Greek waters in 2023, relaying false positions to conceal its route (El Confidencial, 2023; Naucher, 2025; DW, 2025; OCCRP, 2025; Perragin & Renouard, 2024).

Final destinations of products and stopovers in international waters

The products transported by the Russian Shadow Fleet are mainly destined for countries that do not apply sanctions against Russia or are willing to participate in illicit trade, especially China, India, Turkey and, to a lesser extent, countries such as Iran, North Korea, Brazil and Egypt. Below, I detail the final destinations of the most relevant goods, the stopovers and exchanges of goods in international waters, and how these operations facilitate the circumvention of sanctions:

1. Crude oil and petroleum products:

- Main destinations:

  • China: In 2023, China imported 2.1 million barrels per day of Russian crude oil, representing 19% of its total oil imports. The Shadow Fleet transports most of this crude oil, especially to ports such as Dalian and Qingdao, where Russian oil is mixed with crude oil from other sources to conceal its origin (MDPI, 2025; El Confidencial, 2023). In November 2024, 196 oil tankers loaded with crude oil left Russian ports, mainly bound for China (Infobae, 2025).
  • India: India buys almost half of the Russian crude oil exported by the Shadow Fleet, with ports such as Vadinar and Mundra as key destinations. In 2023, the volume of Russian crude oil shipped to India increased fourfold compared to pre-invasion levels (El Confidencial, 2023). For example, the oil tanker Beks Sun sailed from Kozmino (Russia) to India in July 2023 (El Confidencial, 2023).
  • Turkey: Turkey is a crucial hub for the ‘laundering’ of Russian oil. Ports such as Ceyhan and Mersin receive Russian crude oil, which is then refined and re-exported to the EU as non-sanctioned fuel. Between 2023 and 2024, Turkish purchases of Russian oil grew by 105%, while its fuel exports to the EU increased by 107% (Meduza, 2024).
  • Other destinations: Egypt and Brazil have emerged as secondary destinations. For example, the oil tanker Eventin left Ust-Luga (Russia) bound for Egypt in January 2025, although it was seized in Germany after drifting. Brazil imports Russian oil and fertilisers, such as DAP phosphates, through ports such as Santos (USDA, 2023).

- Stopovers and exchanges in international waters:

  • Shadow Fleet vessels carry out STS transfers in international waters to conceal the origin of the oil. Key areas include the Gulf of Laconia (Greece), the Gulf of Oman, the South Atlantic (near Cape Verde), the Alboran Sea, and waters near Ceuta and Malta (DFRLab, 2024; Nuestromar, 2023). For example, a Cameroonian oil tanker was detected in October 2022 loitering off Cape Verde, increasing its draught after an STS transfer, before unloading in Turkey (Nuestromar, 2023). In the Gulf of Laconia, Russian ships transfer oil to Chinese or Indian vessels, which then transport it to its final destinations (El Mundo, 2024).
  • Intermediate ports such as Fujairah (United Arab Emirates) and Kozmino (Russia) are used to mix Russian oil with crude from other sources, such as the Middle East, to disguise it as non-sanctioned before re-export (Perragin & Renouard, 2025). These operations are common in international waters to avoid the jurisdiction of countries that apply sanctions.

2. Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG):

- Main destinations:

  • China and India: Shadow Fleet tankers, especially those operating from Arctic LNG 2, supply Chinese ports such as Jiangsu and Guangdong, and Indian ports such as Dahej. In 2024, the EU banned the re-export of Russian LNG, prompting Russia to redirect these shipments to Asia (The Japan Times, 2024).
  • Other destinations: Countries such as Malaysia and Singapore have emerged as secondary destinations, where Russian LNG is re-exported or mixed with gas from other sources (Oxford Analytica, 2024).
  • Stopovers and exchanges:
    • STS transfers of LNG are less common than those of oil, but have been recorded in international waters near Singapore and Malaysia, where Russian gas tankers transfer cargo to third-country vessels to conceal its origin (The Japan Times, 2024). For example, ships in the Shadow Fleet often carry out these operations in the Strait of Malacca, a strategic point for Asian maritime trade.

3. DAP phosphates and other fertilisers:

- Main destinations:

  • Brazil: Brazil is a key importer of Russian fertilisers, including DAP phosphates, which arrive at ports such as Santos and Paranaguá. In 2023, Russia exported approximately 7 million tonnes of fertilisers to Brazil, much of it via the Shadow Fleet (USDA, 2023).
  • India and China: Both countries import Russian fertilisers, especially urea and phosphates, through ports such as Mundra (India) and Qingdao (China). These exports have continued despite quotas imposed by Russia to prioritise its domestic market (USDA, 2023).
  • Africa and Latin America: Countries such as Egypt and Argentina receive Russian fertilisers, albeit to a lesser extent, through ports such as Alexandria and Buenos Aires (War Sanctions, 2025).
  • Stopovers and exchanges:
    • Fertilisers are usually transported directly from Russian ports such as Ust-Luga and Novorossiysk, but some ships make stopovers at intermediate ports such as Fujairah or Dubai for STS transfers or to mix cargoes with fertilisers from other sources, making traceability difficult (War Sanctions, 2025). These operations are less frequent than in the case of oil, but have been recorded in the South Atlantic and the Mediterranean.

4. Stolen agricultural products:

Main destinations:

  • Iran and North Korea: Agricultural products stolen from occupied Ukraine, such as wheat and barley, are shipped to Iran (ports such as Bandar Abbas) and North Korea (port of Nampo) as part of trade agreements to strengthen strategic alliances (War Sanctions, 2025).
  • Turkey and Syria: Turkey receives stolen grain through ports such as Mersin, while Syria, a key ally of Russia, imports wheat through Tartus (Atlantic Council, 2024).

Stopovers and exchanges:

  • Ships carrying stolen grain carry out STS transfers in the Black Sea, especially near the Kerch Strait, to transfer cargo to ships flying flags of convenience, which then deliver it to its final destinations (War Sanctions, 2025). For example, a Shadow Fleet vessel was detected in March 2025 loading wheat in Kamysh-Burun (occupied Ukraine) before conducting an STS transfer in the Black Sea.

5. Weapons and dual-use goods:

Main destinations:

  • Russia: Dual-use goods, such as electronic and drone components, are transported from Iran to Russian ports such as Novorossiysk and Vladivostok. These shipments are essential for the production of weapons used in Ukraine (War Sanctions, 2025).
  • Other allies: There are indications that North Korea and Syria receive dual-use goods through the Shadow Fleet, although data is limited (Infobae, 2025).
  • Stopovers and exchanges:
    • STS transfers of dual-use goods take place in international waters, especially in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea, where Iranian ships transfer cargo to Russian Shadow Fleet vessels (War Sanctions, 2025). These operations are highly covert due to the sensitivity of the goods.

Comparison with the Shadow Fleets of Iran and Venezuela

The Shadow Fleets of Iran and Venezuela, although pioneers in evading maritime sanctions, are significantly smaller and less sophisticated than Russia's. Below is a detailed comparison, analysing how Russia has been inspired by these fleets and in what ways it surpasses them.

1. Size and scale

- Russia: The Russian Shadow Fleet is the largest in the world, with 1,100 to 1,400 vessels in 2023, of which 435 are crude oil tankers, representing 16% of the global tanker fleet (KSE, 2024; Brookings, 2025). In June 2024, it transported 4.1 million barrels per day, 83% of Russian crude oil and 46% of petroleum products (KSE, 2024). Russia has invested $10 billion since 2022 in the acquisition of ships, many of them purchased from Western shipowners, especially Greek ones, which account for 66% of the fleet's capacity (Brookings, 2025; Euractiv, 2025).

- Iran: The Iranian fleet has 100 to 150 vessels, mainly crude oil tankers and some gas tankers, which transport approximately 1.5 million barrels per day, almost exclusively to China (Vortexa, 2023; Kharon, 2025). Its size is limited by financial constraints and lack of access to Western vessels.

- Venezuela: The Venezuelan fleet is even smaller, with 50 to 80 vessels, many shared with Iran, transporting about 0.6 million barrels per day to China and other Asian markets (Vortexa, 2023; Atlantic Council, 2024).

- Comparison: The Russian Shadow Fleet surpasses those of Iran and Venezuela in size and capacity. While the Iranian and Venezuelan fleets account for less than 5% of the global tanker fleet, the Russian fleet accounts for 16%, allowing it to dominate the illicit oil market (UNCTAD, 2023). Russia's massive investment and access to Western vessels, especially from Greece, have enabled this expansion (Brookings, 2025). The Russian fleet has adopted and improved tactics used by Iran, such as turning off AIS or STS transfers, adding diversification of routes and destinations, advanced technology such as GNSS signal manipulation, direct military support and the massive acquisition of Western vessels, especially from European shipping companies (OCCRP, 2025; Le Monde, 2024).

2. Operational sophistication

- Russia: The Russian Shadow Fleet combines advanced tactics such as AIS deactivation, STS transfers, GNSS manipulation, flags of convenience, opaque ownership structures and military escorts. For example, in June 2025, the Russian Navy escorted the vessels Selva and Sierra with the corvette Boykiy, a practice unprecedented at this level in the Iranian or Venezuelan fleets. GNSS manipulation, detected in the South Atlantic and Black Sea, allows ships to falsify their locations, while STS transfers in multiple regions (Gulf of Laconia, South Atlantic, Alboran Sea) maximise opacity (Nuestromar, 2023; International Bar Association, 2025).

- Iran: Iran pioneered tactics such as AIS deactivation and STS transfers in the 2000s, especially in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. However, its operations are less diversified and depend almost exclusively on China as a destination, with STS transfers limited to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea (Kharon, 2025; Perragin & Renouard, 2025).

- Venezuela: Venezuela uses tactics similar to those of Iran, such as deactivating AIS and STS transfers in the Caribbean and near Malaysia, but its operations are less sophisticated due to financial and logistical constraints. It relies heavily on Iran for logistics and maintenance of its fleet, which reduces its autonomy (Vortexa, 2023).

- Comparison: Russia has refined the tactics of Iran and Venezuela, integrating military escorts, advanced technology such as GNSS manipulation, and greater diversification of routes and destinations. The scale of its operations and its ability to acquire Western vessels give it a significant advantage (Windward, 2025).

3. Inspiration from Iran and Venezuela

- Direct inspiration: Russia has clearly drawn inspiration from the Shadow Fleets of Iran and Venezuela, which have evaded maritime sanctions since the 1990s and 2000s, respectively (Atlantic Council, 2024). Iran developed tactics such as deactivating AIS and STS transfers to ship oil to China, while Venezuela adopted these practices to export crude oil through Malaysia and Singapore (El Confidencial, 2023). Russia, aware of potential sanctions following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, began planning its fleet before 2022, acquiring end-of-life vessels and adopting the practices of Iran and Venezuela.

- Adaptations and improvements: Russia has improved on the tactics of Iran and Venezuela by:

  • Scaling up the fleet: The Russian Shadow Fleet has reorganised the global maritime market, accounting for 20% of crude oil tankers and 7% of fuel ships worldwide, according to Trafigura (Nuestromar, 2023). In contrast, the Iranian and Venezuelan fleets have a marginal impact on global trade.
  • Diversifying markets: Russia ships oil, LNG and fertilisers to China, India, Turkey, Brazil and Egypt, while Iran and Venezuela rely mainly on China (Veridica, 2024).
  • Integrating state resources: The Russian Navy escorts Shadow Fleet ships, as in the case of the Selva and Sierra convoys in 2025, a practice not documented in Iran or Venezuela.
  • Acquiring Western ships: Between 2022 and 2024, Greek, German, and Norwegian companies sold 230 oil tankers to Russia for $6 billion, many of which were considered scrap, allowing for a massive expansion of the fleet (Euractiv, 2025). Iran and Venezuela, due to financial constraints, have not been able to access Western ships on this scale.
  • Expanding the range of goods: While the Iranian and Venezuelan fleets focus on oil, the Russian Shadow Fleet transports LNG, fertilisers, stolen agricultural products and dual-use goods, reflecting greater versatility (War Sanctions, 2025).

4. Risks and challenges

- Russia: The Russian Shadow Fleet poses significant environmental and geopolitical risks due to its size and the age of its vessels (11% of the global tanker fleet in 2025 is over 20 years old, compared to 3% before the war) (Infobae, 2025). Incidents such as the oil spill in the Black Sea in December 2024, caused by the vessels Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239 (2,400-5,000 tonnes), and the collision of the Andromeda Star in Denmark in March 2024, highlight the environmental dangers (MDPI, 2025; El Mundo, 2024). According to Deutsche Welle (2025), this fleet poses a direct threat to the waters of the Baltic Sea. In addition, reports from the Carnegie Centre in Russian indicate that many of these vessels operate without valid insurance, exposing coastal countries to the costs of potential ecological disasters (Carnegie, 2024).. Geopolitically, the fleet has been used for sabotage, such as the damage to the Estlink-2 cable between Finland and Estonia in 2024, attributed to the vessel Eagle S, which suggests that this fleet could be used for hybrid warfare (FT, 2024; The Washington Post, 2025).

- Iran: The Iranian fleet poses environmental risks, but its impact is minor due to its size. Minor spills in the Persian Gulf have been reported, but not on the scale of the Russian incidents (Eurasia Review, 2025).

- Venezuela: The poorly maintained Venezuelan fleet has caused spills in the Caribbean, but their global impact is limited (Atlantic Council, 2024).

- Comparison: The Russian Shadow Fleet poses a greater risk due to its scale and its use in sabotage activities, such as cutting submarine cables, making it a strategic as well as an economic threat (CSIS, 2025).

5. International response

- Russia: The G7, the EU and the UK have stepped up sanctions against the Shadow Fleet, designating 180 vessels in January 2025 (US), 135 in July 2025 (UK) and 60 in June 2025 (Australia): 270 vessels in total. It is estimated that only 40% of suspected vessels had been formally sanctioned by March 2025 (Le Grand Continent, 2025). The EU has banned access to ports and services for sanctioned ships since June 2024, and Baltic countries such as Estonia and Latvia have proposed Shadow Fleet-free zones (Euronews, 2025). The UK Joint Expeditionary Force operation in 2025 uses artificial intelligence to monitor the fleet (International Bar Association, 2025). The European Parliament and the Renew Europe group have called for exclusion zones for these fleets and a ban on STS transfers in EU waters (Renew Europe, 2024; INASP, 2025).

- Iran and Venezuela: The Iranian and Venezuelan fleets face sanctions, but on a smaller scale. In July 2025, the US sanctioned Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani, an Iranian tycoon linked to the Russian Shadow Fleet, for transporting Iranian and Russian oil (Politico, 2025). However, international pressure is focused on Russia due to its greater global impact.

- Comparison: The Russian Shadow Fleet faces more intense international pressure due to its size and role in sabotaging critical infrastructure. However, the lack of an official list of ships and the difficulty of tracking them limit the effectiveness of sanctions (Atlantic Council, 2024).

Implications and risks

The Russian Shadow Fleet not only allows Russia to circumvent sanctions, but also poses significant risks. From an environmental perspective, the ships, with an average age of 18 years, are prone to breakdowns and spills. The Black Sea incident in December 2024, in which the vessels Volgoneft-212 and Volgoneft-239 released between 2,400 and 5,000 tonnes of oil, was described as the worst environmental disaster of the century in the region, affecting marine wildlife and generating clean-up costs that fell on coastal countries (MDPI, 2025). The collision of the Andromeda Star in Denmark in March 2024 and the drift of the Eventin near Rügen, Germany, in January 2025 highlight the risks posed by these poorly maintained vessels (Euronews, 2025).

Geopolitically, the Shadow Fleet represents a form of aggression in the ‘grey zone’. The sabotage of submarine cables, such as the Eagle S incident in the Baltic in 2024, which cut the Estlink-2 cable and two telecommunications cables, suggests that the fleet is used for covert operations beyond trade (El Mundo, 2024). These incidents have led countries such as Finland, Estonia, Latvia and the United Kingdom to intensify sanctions and propose Shadow Fleet-free zones, while NATO has strengthened maritime surveillance in the Baltic (Euronews, 2025).

Economically, the Shadow Fleet has reconfigured global maritime trade, increasing freight costs due to high demand for ships for illicit operations (Nuestromar, 2023). However, sanctions have had a limited impact, as countries such as China, India and Turkey continue to purchase Russian goods, and opaque structures make it difficult to enforce restrictive measures (Cinco Días, 2024).

Conclusion

The Russian Shadow Fleet is a maritime system of unprecedented scale and sophistication, inspired by the fleets of Iran and Venezuela, but surpassing them in size, diversification and state support. It transports a wide range of goods, from crude oil and LNG to fertilisers, stolen agricultural products and dual-use goods, with main destinations in China, India, Turkey, Brazil, Iran and North Korea. Its methods, which include AIS deactivation, STS transfers, flags of convenience, opaque ownership structures, GNSS manipulation and military escorts, reflect exceptional adaptability. STS transfers in international waters, such as the Gulf of Laconia, the South Atlantic and the Gulf of Oman, and stopovers in ports such as Fujairah and Kozmino, allow Russia to conceal the origin of its products and circumvent sanctions. Compared to the fleets of Iran and Venezuela, the Russian Shadow Fleet stands out for its ability to acquire Western vessels, diversify markets and employ military resources, making it a key economic and strategic tool. However, its environmental risks, such as spills in the Black Sea, and geopolitical risks, such as the sabotage of submarine cables, have intensified the international response, although sanctions still face challenges in dismantling this network. The Shadow Fleet not only challenges the global maritime order, but also raises questions about the effectiveness of sanctions in a context of cooperation with countries not aligned with the West.

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