Hypersonic Weapons: Technology, Critical Chains, Doctrines and Governance (2010–2035). A Six-Chapter Technical–Strategic Assessment of Capability, Defence and Implications for International Stability

Introduction

This dossier arises from a demanding premise: hypersonic weapons have ceased to be a laboratory promise and have become real instruments of power, whose understanding requires crossing disciplinary boundaries—materials physics, propulsion and aerodynamics; the political economy of supply chains; employment doctrine and command–control; international law and governance—without relaxing rigour in any of them. The aim is to provide an integrated, technically precise and strategically useful assessment of the hypersonic phenomenon between 2010 and 2035, with particular attention to its implications for international stability and to the requirements of European strategic autonomy.

The analytical framework adopted is deliberately realist: deterrent credibility is understood as the convergence of reproducible capability, explicit will and plausible communication. That triangle frames the dossier. Capability encompasses far more than a flight demonstrator: it includes series production and replenishment, logistics, sensors, multi-layered defence and the economics of the critical chains that make the system viable. Will is not inferred from isolated statements, but from budgets, test chronologies and rules of engagement. Communication is not propaganda: it is the plausible signal that reduces ambiguity in crises and enables the adversary to interpret escalation without defaulting to worst-case responses.

Terminology should be precise from the outset. A hypersonic weapon is any system which, in a relevant phase of atmospheric flight, sustains speeds equal to or above Mach 5 with significant manoeuvrability. Within that category, the hypersonic missile is the combat vector that materialises the capability in an operational context. There are two principal families: the hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), which receives an initial rocket boost and then glides in the atmosphere under aerodynamic control; and the hypersonic cruise missile (HCM), which flies in the atmosphere using hypersonic propulsion (scramjet). When the text refers to the technical field in the abstract it will use expressions such as hypersonic technology or hypersonic capability; except where strictly necessary, it will avoid substantivised constructions such as “the hypersonic”.

Four questions guide the research. First, what hypersonic technology demands in physical and engineering terms—aerothermodynamics, guidance in ionised environments, scramjet stability—and what hard constraints that reality imposes on operational promise. Second, which materials, semiconductors and processes—and in which geographies—turn a vector into a reproducible capability, and which bottlenecks present the greatest risk across rare earths (Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb), thermal-protection systems (UHTC and C/C composites) and power electronics (GaN/SiC). Third, how the principal actors are integrating hypersonic missiles into their doctrines and C4ISR architectures, with what chronologies, firms and budgets, and what realistic effects should be expected in theatres such as the Indo-Pacific, Europe or the Middle East. Fourth, how defences ought to respond: which multi-layered architecture is plausible, with what physical limits, which verifiable metrics and which rules of engagement and crisis guardrails reduce the risk of misattribution and error-driven escalation.

The dossier makes five principal contributions. First, an uncompromising technical synthesis of aerothermodynamic fundamentals, of guidance and discrimination under plasma, and of scramjet viability—with equations, orders of magnitude and their operational translation. Second, a functional map of critical chains—rare earths and NdFeB/SmCo magnets; UHTC and C/C composites; GaN/SiC and hardened avionics—linking materials and processes to deterrent credibility and proposing realistic industrial mitigation. Third, a comparative, actor-by-actor reading of programmes, chronologies, contractors, doctrine and costs, with employment scenarios that integrate C4ISR and electronic warfare. Fourth, a defence architecture against hypersonic missiles that transcends the fetish of the single interceptor and places at the centre track custody from space, validated multi-sensor fusion and a missile-economy that blends kinetic effectors, non-kinetic measures and directed energy. Fifth, a practical governance agenda—limited technical transparency, verified hotlines, pre-notification templates, adjustments to MTCR/HCoC/Wassenaar—and a set of operational metrics to anchor stability in measurable outcomes.

The methodology combines technical-scientific review, official documentation and analysis from leading think-tanks, with evidentiary cut-off at 2025 and scenario projection to 2035. A falsification logic is applied: where a claim rests on a state source without independent verification, it is explicitly treated as declarative; where estimates diverge, the range is presented and the methodological preference is justified. In defence and governance, proposals are accompanied by metrics, thresholds and timelines so that discussion is auditable. To facilitate consultation and updating, the dossier includes HTML tables ready for web insertion.

Two scoping notes. Unless otherwise indicated, the text will use hypersonic weapon (category) and hypersonic missile (vector) with the stated distinction, and will spell out acronyms on first use: hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), hypersonic cruise missile (HCM), command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), probability of kill (Pk). The 2010–2035 period is not intended to capture the historical origins of hypersonic technology, but its decade-and-a-half of operational maturation and the reasonable projection of chains and institutions.

The six-chapter structure follows this logic of integration. Chapter I establishes physical foundations, history and theory, situating the problem within the capability–will–communication triangle. Chapter II descends to the material and electronic base and maps critical chains with their risks and mitigations. Chapter III analyses programmes and actors—chronologies, firms, budgets and doctrines—with theatre-specific employment scenarios. Chapter IV proposes a verifiable defence against hypersonic missiles: space layer, fusion, glide-phase interceptors, non-kinetics and rules of engagement. Chapter V translates technology into doctrine, deterrence, proliferation and governance, and suggests concrete instruments for stability. Chapter VI looks to 2030–2035 with scenarios, sensitivities, a roadmap and metrics, identifying responsibilities to materialise capabilities and rules.

The intended audience is twofold. On the one hand, policymakers in defence, industry and foreign affairs who require an empirical base to prioritise investment and negotiate rules; on the other, the academic and technical community that demands precision in concepts, equations and orders of magnitude, and verifiable proposals. The ambition is to serve both without sacrificing technical density or policy utility.

A final caution. Hypersonic technology operates at the edge between science and policy. This dossier strives for excellence without yielding to uncritical enthusiasm or automatic scepticism: where evidence supports a claim, it is offered with its limits; where it does not, we propose how to measure or govern it. If modern deterrence rests on reproducible capability, explicit will and plausible communication, the knowledge that underpins it should be equally reproducible, explicit and plausible. That is the commitment informing the pages that follow.

Chapter I: History and Technical Foundations of Hypersonic Missiles

Hypersonic missiles, understood as vectors capable of maintaining speeds above Mach 5 in atmospheric flight with significant manoeuvrability, have in just a few decades progressed from laboratory experiments to central elements in deterrence doctrines and modernisation plans of the major powers. Their relevance derives from the convergence of three difficult-to-combine features: extreme speed, flight profiles at intermediate altitudes (approx. 20–70 km), and trajectories sufficiently unpredictable to complicate early detection, continuous tracking, and interception.

Interest in these systems dates back to the final years of the Second World War, when visionary projects such as the Silbervogel were conceived: a suborbital bomber that, although never materialised, anticipated the logic of the rocket-launched glider, core of today’s HGVs (Hypersonic Glide Vehicles). After 1945, the United States and the Soviet Union inherited teams and know-how that would feed into a new discipline: high-speed aerodynamics. In the United States, the X-15 programme (1959–1968) constituted an empirical leap: 199 flights, with a record of Mach 6.7 and altitudes exceeding 100 km, provided direct data on materials, thermal loads and control in high-enthalpy regimes (Holden, 1986). In parallel, the USSR explored concepts of gliders linked to ballistic missiles, such as the Albatros programme in the 1980s, and demonstrated scramjet prototypes (GLL-8), remote technical antecedents of later developments such as Avangard (Kristensen & Korda, 2025).

During the Cold War, arms control treaties limited classical categories (SALT, START), but did not explicitly define or prohibit hypersonic missiles in atmospheric glide. This normative void enabled both blocs to maintain experimental lines. After 1991, budgetary cycles and altered threat perceptions reduced ambition: in the United States, the NASP/X-30 was cancelled in 1994 for technical inviability and cost, though research continued at a lower level. In 2004, NASA’s X-43A reached Mach 9.6 for around 10 seconds, and in 2013 the X-51 Waverider maintained ~Mach 5 for 210 seconds, demonstrating the physical feasibility of the scramjet with sustained powered flight at experimental scale (Van Wie, 2021). The return to heightened strategic competition after 2014 reactivated the agenda: Russia declared Avangard (a glider mounted on an ICBM) operational, China displayed the DF-17 with DF-ZF glider in 2019 as part of its A2/AD architecture, and the United States elevated LRHW and CPS to priority programmes (Congressional Research Service [CRS], 2025). Europe, characteristically, oriented its response towards integrated defence, with projects such as HYDEF and HYDIS² under the European Defence Fund (European Commission, 2025), while France advanced with V-MAX as a demonstrator.

The physics of hypersonic flight explains both its appeal and its limits. Stagnation temperature grows with Mach number and the gas’s adiabatic coefficient according to the classic relation T0​=T[1+(γ−1)M2/2]. Under stratospheric conditions (T ≈ 220 K), a Mach 7 flight raises stagnation temperature to ~1,600 K (~1,300 °C), without considering real-gas, radiative or ionisation effects. Leading edges and radomes therefore endure extreme heat fluxes and severe temperature gradients. The engineering response combines ultra-high temperature ceramics (UHTC, such as hafnium carbides or zirconium diborides), carbon–carbon composites, and ablative coatings, with designs that manage erosion and thermal fatigue (Peters et al., 2024). In hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs), scramjet propulsion adds a second frontier: stable supersonic combustion operates within narrow pressure and temperature windows; fuel is also employed as a structural coolant to remove heat from engine and airframe. In hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), part of the propulsion complexity shifts to aerodynamic control during long-range glide after rocket boost.

Avionics and guidance constitute the third challenge. At high velocities, plasma enveloping the vehicle attenuates radiofrequency propagation and degrades satellite navigation. Hence the adoption of high-precision inertial navigation reinforced by optical/infrared sensors and predictive algorithms. Multisensor fusion and estimation methods are an area of intense experimentation; large-scale operational integration remains an objective, not a standard.

There is no academic consensus on the disruptive impact of these weapons. A critical line highlights very high costs, employment complexity and unproven effectiveness in saturation or fog-of-war scenarios, and warns against technologist narratives fuelling a suboptimal arms race (Acton, 2019; Gormley, 2020). Another current maintains that the combination of speed, low radar cross-section and manoeuvrability erodes stability based on Mutual Assured Destruction, by shortening decision windows, complicating continuous tracking and opening more credible, if not guaranteed, first-strike options (Freedman, 2004; Lieber & Press, 2023). In practical doctrine, Russia integrates them into its logic of controlled escalation; China into its Pacific A2/AD architecture; the United States within its vision of conventional prompt strike; and Europe, aware of its dependencies, prioritises hypersonic defence within an integrated air and missile defence architecture, while seeking selective industrial autonomy (SWP, 2023; EUISS, 2024; IFRI, 2024).

Recent Asian experience provides useful nuance. Japan’s 2023 Defence White Paper identified the development of and defence against hypersonic missiles as a strategic line, with investments in sensors, glide-phase interception and resilient command-and-control (Japan Ministry of Defense, 2023). In China, technical publications and academic reviews point to a growing critical mass in hypersonic tunnels, UHTC materials and glider design, though open access to flight validation data is limited and English-language literature is often summarised or secondary (see overviews in CAS journals and university technical compendia).

As an illustrative aid, the following table synthesises technical differences and strategic consequences between glider vehicles (HGVs) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCMs). Its function is illustrative and does not substitute for the analysis developed.

Note: figures and characterisations based on CRS (2025), SIPRI (2025), Van Wie (2021), Acton (2019), IFRI (2024) and SWP (2023).

Beyond the technical dimension, the recent history of these systems intertwines with an arms control framework increasingly eroded. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty in 2019, uncertainty over the continuity of START frameworks, and the absence of a specific regime for hypersonic missiles have created an environment in which technological innovation advances faster than strategic governance. In this context, some European analysts argue for including hypersonic missiles—at least in their nuclear variant—in expanded arms control and transparency discussions, although flight verification and dual classification complicate any inspection scheme (EUISS, 2024; IFRI, 2024).

The chapter closes with two methodological cautions and a legal implication. The first is epistemological: extreme speeds and ranges attributed to certain systems (for example, Mach 20–27 for Avangard) originate from official declarations with little independent verification; they are therefore cited as such and contrasted with technical literature, avoiding unsupported inferences. The second concerns publication bias: part of the open literature comes from techno-scientific conferences and government compendia with explicit agendas; this report adopts a critical and comparative reading. Legally, the employment of hypersonic missiles—conventional or otherwise—reopens questions of international humanitarian law concerning distinction, proportionality and precaution, given the reduced decision times and potential collateral damage if terminal guidance fails; these aspects will be specifically addressed in a later chapter.

Chapter II: Materials, Electronics and Supply Chains for Hypersonic Missiles

Hypersonic missiles embody the intersection of extreme physics and the geopolitics of resources. Each missile is simultaneously an aerothermodynamic experiment and the condensation of complex, concentrated, and fragile industrial chains. Without hafnium carbide, without dysprosium, without GaN/SiC wafers, the technical equation collapses. The capacity for hypersonic missiles, as Martín Menjón (2025) reminds us, must be analysed within the realist deterrence triad: capability, will, and communication. Here, capability is material, tangible, and dependent upon resources dispersed and poorly distributed across a multipolar international system.

Matter as the limit of speed

Atmospheric friction at Mach 5–10 generates temperatures between 1,800 and 2,500 °C on leading edges and radomes. Ultra-High Temperature Ceramics (UHTCs), such as hafnium carbide (~3,900 °C) or zirconium diboride (~3,240 °C), and carbon–carbon (C/C) composites with minimal thermal expansion, are the only viable technical responses.

What is crucial, however, is not the theoretical properties but the difficulty of scaling. The Journal of the European Ceramic Society (2023) emphasises: “the global production of aerospace-grade UHTCs is limited; manufacturing a hypersonic missile radome requires months and costs on the order of tens of thousands of dollars per kilogram” (p. 5124).

History reinforces this fragility: the Apollo programme depended on ablatives that determined re-entry schedules; the Space Shuttle required inspection of thousands of ceramic tiles after each flight; the Soviet Union used ablative coatings on Soyuz capsules, less sophisticated yet equally resource-intensive. Today, the thermal protection system of a hypersonic missile reproduces that industrial dilemma.

Critical minerals and the power of concentration

The actuators of a hypersonic missile require permanent NdFeB and SmCo magnets, with 20–50 kg per vector depending on design. Dysprosium and terbium are indispensable to maintain magnetic properties at high temperature. China controls 70% of extraction and 85% of refining (USGS, 2025).

Baotou, in Inner Mongolia, epitomises this hegemony: separation plants surrounded by toxic waste lakes. Amnesty International (2023) reports that “inadequate waste management has contaminated aquifers and severely affected local communities” (p. 47).

China’s dominance was built from the 1980s through subsidies, aggressive pricing, and initially lax environmental regulation. In 2010 Beijing demonstrated its ability to instrumentalise these chains when it restricted exports to Japan.

Alternatives exist but are limited. The United States reopened Mountain Pass; Australia, with Lynas, supplies roughly 15% of the global market; Japan has invested in recycling with pilot plants in Sendai recovering up to 70% of Nd/Pr from used magnets. The European Union, through the Critical Raw Materials Act (2023), aims to cover 10% of extraction and 40% of refining internally by 2030. Yet, as EUISS warns: “industrial autonomy cannot be decreed: it requires decades of investment and complete ecosystems of innovation” (2024, p. 27).

Vietnam, Brazil, and Greenland emerge as potential suppliers of monazite and heavy rare earths, but their exploitation faces technical, environmental, and geopolitical obstacles.

Wide-bandgap semiconductors: GaN and SiC

Wide-bandgap semiconductors are the “brains” of the hypersonic missile. Gallium nitride (GaN, 3.4 eV) and silicon carbide (SiC, 3.2 eV) sustain AESA radars, plasma-resistant links, and electronic warfare systems. Their thermal resistance and power-handling capacity make them indispensable for electronics under hypersonic conditions.

Production, however, is concentrated: TSMC (Taiwan), Sumitomo and Mitsubishi (Japan), Wolfspeed/Cree (United States). Europe maintains advanced research (Fraunhofer, CNRS, technical universities), but lacks military-scale GaN/SiC foundries. SWP (2023) summarises: “Europe cannot deploy hypersonic interceptors while it depends on chips manufactured in Asia” (p. 14).

The US CHIPS Act (2022) and the EU Chips Act (2023) seek to reverse this dependence with subsidies and industrial programmes. Yet a military-grade foundry takes 5–7 years to mature and requires a complete supplier ecosystem. Vulnerability is exacerbated by the monopoly of ASML (Netherlands), the sole producer of EUV lithography equipment. Without ASML technology, neither China, nor the US, nor Europe can manufacture ≤5 nm chips.

Comparative perspectives: Russia, India, Japan, South Korea, Iran, and Turkey

• Russia: partial autonomy in titanium (VSMPO-AVISMA) and nuclear metallurgy, but dependent on Chinese imports of Dy and Ta. Its operational hypersonic missiles (Avangard, Zircon) rely on industrial balances that include foreign suppliers.
• India: exploits monazite in Odisha and Kerala and signs agreements with Japan and Australia. The success of HSTDV and BrahMos-II depends on developing refining capacity.
• Japan: pioneer in magnet recycling, ferrite substitutes, and strategic stockpiles. The Defence White Paper (2023) highlights vulnerabilities and calls for cooperation.
• South Korea: combines Hycore with an advanced semiconductor sector (Samsung, SK Hynix), but lacks military-scale GaN/SiC.
• Iran: proclaims self-sufficiency, but resources are limited and industrial capacity insufficient.
• Turkey: aspires to partial independence in semiconductors, but hypersonic systems such as Tayfun rely on imports.

The pattern is consistent: even states with advanced programmes depend on international chains they do not control fully.

Ethical and environmental dimensions

The human and ecological costs of critical mineral mining are considerable. UNICEF estimates around 40,000 children work in artisanal cobalt mines in the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Baotou, independent studies report heavy metal concentrations in surface waters up to 10–15 times international safety limits.

Europe faces a normative contradiction: it seeks “values-based strategic autonomy” but its hypersonic programmes risk depending on opaque and environmentally destructive supply chains. IFRI (2024) warns: “the credibility of European autonomy will be eroded if it is built upon chains incompatible with its own principles” (p. 6).

China, conversely, officially claims to have “rationalised” mining, arguing that economic modernisation requires environmental costs. The gap between this discourse and independent evidence is stark.

Mitigation strategies

The United States, Japan, the European Union, and NATO allies have launched measures combining stockpiling, recycling, supplier diversification, and industrial incentives:

• United States: National Defense Stockpile partially replenished; offtake contracts with MP Materials; CHIPS Act subsidies; recycling programmes.
• Japan: strategic stockpiles; pilot recycling plants (Sendai) recovering up to 70% of Nd/Pr; bilateral agreements with Australia.
• European Union: Critical Raw Materials Act; EU Chips Act; funding for recycling projects (Fraunhofer, universities).
• NATO: early discussions on critical supply chains, yet not operationally consolidated.

Outcomes and limitations: Japanese recycling demonstrates technical feasibility but limited scale; the US stockpile covers only a fraction of projected demand for LRHW; EU initiatives are promising yet still embryonic compared to Asian and American capacity.

Bibliographic debate and conflicting perspectives

Three analytical positions dominate:

• Alarmist: NDIA (2023), CRS (2025), Chatham House (2025) highlight immediate vulnerability. “Without secure access to dysprosium and terbium, Western hypersonic programmes are unviable” (NDIA, 2023, p. 19).
• Moderate: SIPRI (Schreer, 2022), SWP (2023) acknowledge risks but emphasise diversification, technological substitution, and recycling.
• Technological optimism: Japanese technical literature (Nikkei Asia, 2024) points to advances in recovery and ferrite substitutes that could reduce dependence.

The synthesis: real vulnerability in the short term, mitigable in the medium term through sustained industrial policy and international cooperation.

The voice of China

Reports from the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS, 2024) and the Chinese Academy of Aerospace Aerodynamics (CAAA, 2024) highlight China’s ambition to integrate civil and military capacity around hypersonic technologies. They underline progress in hypersonic tunnels, UHTC, and resistant electronics. Official narratives emphasise self-sufficiency and link advances to the “dual circulation” strategy. Strategically, Beijing presents industrial competitiveness as both a source of security and a pillar of international power projection.

Epilogue: 2035 and the proliferation of hypersonic missiles

By 2035, a dozen states could field hypersonic missiles. Demand for Dy, Tb, and GaN would increase exponentially, stretching already fragile chains. Two consequences are likely:

1. Control regimes (MTCR, HCoC) will need adaptation or risk obsolescence.
2. Control of critical minerals and manufacturing capacity will be as decisive as control of launchers or delivery systems.

EUISS (2024) concludes: “future deterrence will not be measured only in megatons or Mach, but in resilient chains and the capacity to sustain them in crisis” (p. 33).

Historical comparative framework

Dependence on strategic materials is not new. The First World War revealed the importance of rubber; the Second, of oil; the Cold War, of enriched uranium. Hypersonic missiles belong to that genealogy: cutting-edge technologies whose operational viability depends on scarce and fragile resources.

Conclusion of the section

The central paradox is unequivocal. The hypersonic missile, designed to outpace defences and shorten decision times, depends on production and supply chains that are fragile and politically exposed. Material capability —tonnes of dysprosium, wafers of GaN, aerospace-grade UHTCs— is the ultimate foundation of credible deterrence.

As Martín Menjón (2025) stresses, realist deterrence rests on capability, will, and communication; without sustained material capability, will becomes rhetoric and communication an empty gesture. Ultimately, the hypersonic missile is a paradox: a weapon conceived to challenge any global defence, yet dependent upon mines, refineries, and factories as fragile as the order it seeks to transform.

Here are the British English versions of Chapters III and IV, fully translated and aligned with the academic tone and structure we established. I’ve kept the headings and the HTML tables (for easy web embedding) and used British spelling and terminology throughout.

Chapter III: Programmes, Actors and Strategic Credibility: Hypersonic Missiles in Practice

Analysing hypersonic missiles requires combining materials physics, propulsion engineering and advanced aerodynamics with political studies on doctrine, industrial chains and strategic communication. The real value of a hypersonic missile is not reducible to its nominal Mach figure: it stems from the state’s ability to sustain it industrially, integrate it into C2/C4ISR, test it with repeatability and articulate a doctrine and narrative that make its use (or threat of use) credible within margins intelligible to adversaries and allies. From a classical realist perspective of deterrence—capability, will and communication—it is essential to evaluate not only the technology but also the industry that reproduces it and the policy that employs it. This chapter offers an integrated, up-to-date view (to 2025) of the principal actors, their programmes and their effects on strategic stability.

United States: multiple programmes, a test chronology, and the challenge of repeatable reliability

The United States’ history with hypersonic missiles is paradoxical. It was a pioneer in experimental high-speed flight during the Cold War with the X-15, which reached Mach 6.7 in 1967, and with programmes such as NASP/X-30, cancelled in 1993 after major cost overruns. In 2010 and 2011 DARPA’s Falcon Project HTV-2 flew twice; both flights failed within minutes due to control issues, yet yielded critical data on aerothermodynamics and materials. Those experiments showed that the physical fundamentals were known, but industrial maturity was lacking.

From 2014 onward, amid concern over Russian and Chinese advances, the Pentagon relaunched the hypersonic agenda. The Department of Defense Hypersonics Strategy (2020) and the National Defense Strategy (2022) flagged these weapons as priorities. The approach chose a diversified portfolio of programmes—at the risk of dispersion but with the benefit of parallel concept exploration.

The Army leads the Long-Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW, “Dark Eagle”). Its chronology shows gradual progress and setbacks: an experimental glider in 2017; a joint Common Hypersonic Glide Body (C-HGB) test in March 2020 exceeding 3,700 km; a 2021 integration failure from electrical issues; deployment delays in 2022; a successful Hawaii flight in 2023; and an initial Indo-Pacific fielding scheduled for 2025. Lockheed Martin integrates the system, Dynetics builds the glider, and Northrop Grumman with Aerojet Rocketdyne provide propulsion.

The Navy’s Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) adapts the same C-HGB to naval platforms. An October 2022 land launch validated subsystems. Integration into Virginia-class submarines is planned around 2026 and later into Zumwalt-class destroyers. Contracts with Lockheed Martin exceed USD 2 billion.

The Air Force managed the Air-Launched Rapid Response Weapon (ARRW), carried by B-52. Between 2019 and 2021 several ignition failures occurred; in December 2022 a complete Mach 5 flight succeeded, but a March 2023 failure led to cancellation. In 2024 Congress funded a limited redesign; tests in 2025 sought to rebuild credibility.

In parallel, DARPA’s Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept (HAWC) validated next-generation scramjets in 2021–2022 with multi-minute Mach 5+ flights; Tactical Boost Glide (TBG) explored manoeuvring gliders. These are not intended for immediate fielding but to generate data feeding service lines.

Budgets have been substantial. In FY2019 hypersonics totalled USD 2.6bn; in FY2023, USD 4.7bn; in FY2025, USD 6.9bn. CRS cautions that simultaneous modernisation of the nuclear triad and F-35 forces prioritisation. Think tanks such as RAND warn about portfolio dispersion. Some legislators press to accelerate vis-à-vis China; others point to early LRHW unit costs—above USD 40m per missile in initial lots—as unsustainable without scale.

Doctrinally, hypersonics fit within conventional prompt strike, offering rapid conventional options against strategic or mobile targets without resorting to nuclear use. This supports extended deterrence for Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia, complementing the nuclear triad within flexible escalation. Yet compressed decision windows raise miscalculation risks, requiring crisis protocols and selective transparency.

Practically, integration depends on C4ISR ecosystems. Since 2023 the Space Development Agency has launched LEO infrared satellites (HBTSS), complemented by over-the-horizon radar and AI-enabled trajectory prediction. Without detection and hand-off, speed is irrelevant.

The main US challenge is not will or communication—both are clear—but repeatable production and deployment. Dependence on rare earths, GaN/SiC semiconductors and Asia-centred advanced lithography is a vulnerability. Each failed test erodes communication; each industrial delay affects perceived capability. In realist terms, will and communication exist, but material capability remains tied to fragile global chains.

In concrete scenarios, planners envisage LRHW batteries on islands such as the Marianas or the Philippines to deter Chinese naval moves near Taiwan, and CPS from Virginia-class submarines striking key radars pre-conflict. Such use-cases, sketched in planning documents, show the hypersonic option as an intermediate rung between inaction and nuclear escalation.

The dialectic is complete when defence is added. The US is investing not only in offensive hypersonics but also in Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) concepts to engage gliders mid-course; in 2024–2025 MDA awarded maturation contracts to Raytheon and Northrop. Offence and defence thus evolve together; deterrence becomes a dynamic balance.

In sum, the United States is at an inflection point: translating decades of experimentation into repeatable systems. Its advantage lies in industry and alliances; its weakness, in critical chains and reliability. Hypersonic deterrence will be credible if sustained testing, scalable production and coherent strategic messaging converge; otherwise the leadership narrative risks exposure to reality.

Russia: early fielding, active deterrence and the limits of industrial sustainability

Russia was the first to declare operational hypersonic missiles, a centrepiece of its strategic narrative. In March 2018 President Putin publicly unveiled Avangard, Kinzhal and Zircon as proof that Moscow had outpaced Western missile defences. The staging—including animations depicting strikes on Florida—underscored the communicative dimension: it was about technology, will and messaging to NATO, Russia’s public and emerging actors.

Soviet programmes in the 1980s–1990s laid foundations. Albatros pursued a manoeuvring ICBM-mounted glider but was cancelled after the USSR’s collapse; GLL-8 Igla and conceptual AJAX explored hypersonic aerothermodynamics.

In the 21st century Russia reactivated these lines with NPO Mashinostroyeniya and the Tactical Missiles Corporation. Avangard reportedly tested in 2004 and 2010 (failures), 2013 (partial) and 2016–2018 (successes). In December 2019 the MoD announced operational Avangard on UR-100NUTTH ICBMs in Orenburg.

Kinzhal (Kh-47M2), an air-launched Iskander variant, flew in 2017 and was declared operational in 2018. Since 2022 it has been used in Ukraine against depots and air defences; in May 2023 Ukraine reported a Patriot PAC-3 intercept, denting invulnerability claims.

Zircon (3M22) saw early reports in 2012, flights in 2016, multiple launches from Admiral Gorshkov (2020–2021) and Severodvinsk (2021). In 2022 Putin announced imminent deployment; in January 2023 it was declared operational with the Navy.

Industry rests on Soviet-legacy conglomerates: NPO Mashinostroyeniya (Avangard), KTRV (Kinzhal), Raduga (air-launched missiles), Sevmash (Zircon integration), TsNIIMash (testing), and UAC (air platform adaptation). Strengths coexist with structural weaknesses: dependence on imported advanced semiconductors, lithography machinery and critical materials such as dysprosium and tantalum.

Exact hypersonic spending is opaque. SIPRI estimates 10–15% of Russia’s defence R&D allocated to strategic modernisation and hypersonics. Unit-cost estimates (open-source and unverified) suggest Zircon ~USD 4–6m, Kinzhal ~USD 10m; Avangard much higher, limiting production to dozens. Moscow privileges symbolic quality over mass: a small arsenal able to penetrate US defences bolsters nuclear deterrence without requiring thousands of units.

Russian doctrine (2014 Military Doctrine; 2021 National Security Strategy) stresses overcoming NATO missile defences. Hypersonics form part of “non-nuclear strategic deterrence”, alongside cyber and EW. Avangard underwrites triad penetration; Zircon seeks to deny US naval superiority in the North Atlantic, Arctic and Mediterranean; Kinzhal offers regional flexibility against NATO bases in Eastern Europe. “Escalate to de-escalate” remains central: threatening limited early use to force adversary restraint. Weapon presentations are also communications instruments.

Hypothetical employment: Avangard as nuclear penetration guarantee; Zircon as anti-carrier tool in the North Atlantic/Arctic; Kinzhal as regional deterrent against Polish or Romanian bases. Each fulfils a distinct logic: global nuclear, strategic naval and regional conventional.

Public communication has been carefully managed. Putin’s 2018 videos sought Western psychological effect; TASS and RT amplified Kinzhal’s invulnerability; Western reporting highlighted vulnerabilities after Ukrainian interceptions. Announced tests serve propaganda purposes, reinforcing perceptions of disruptive capability.

Sanctions since 2014—intensified post-2022—restrict access to microchips, lithography and dual-use components. Dependence on China for REE and processors has grown. Industrial demographics (ageing engineers, brain drain) raise long-term sustainability issues; “war-economy” demands for artillery and drones may crowd out complex hypersonic projects.

On capability–will–communication, Russia scores very high on will (combat use of Kinzhal) and strong on communication (presidential speeches, state media), but more limited on sustainable capacity. Operational missiles exist, yet large-scale production and replenishment remain uncertain. The more Moscow projects superiority, the more visible its dependence on global chains it does not fully control—an intrinsic tension within multipolar deterrence.

China: technological acceleration, civil–military fusion and A2/AD as operational architecture

The People’s Republic of China has made hypersonic missiles a pillar of military modernisation—not merely a response to US or Russian programmes, but the expression of a broader project: denying area in the Western Pacific, eroding US extended deterrence over Japan, the ROK and Taiwan, and consolidating industrial autonomy for a long race. In realist terms, Beijing has sought to balance capability, will and communication via intensive testing, sustained investment and a public narrative for domestic and external audiences.

From January 2014 to November 2016, the US DoD recorded at least seven WU-14/DF-ZF hypersonic glider tests from Taiyuan; five were reported as successful, two as control losses. The 70th Anniversary parade (October 2019) publicly displayed the DF-17 with DF-ZF glider. In 2021 reports described a hypersonic test with fractional-orbital characteristics, surprising analysts. In 2022 and 2024 the Navy showcased YJ-21 on Type 055 destroyers for anti-carrier and land-attack roles. In parallel, Beijing inaugurated the JF-22 hypersonic wind tunnel (Mach 20–30), emblematic of infrastructure investment.

Industry is dominated by CASC and CASIC. Within CASC, CALT brings launch-vehicle experience; within CASIC, the Third Academy leads cruise/glider designs. CAAA is central in hypersonic research. Beihang University and NUDT run wind tunnels and combustion labs. State materials institutes produce carbon–carbon composites and ultra-refractory coatings. Civil–military fusion expedites transfers from civil research to military programmes.

Budgets are opaque; RAND/SIPRI estimates point to several billion USD annually for hypersonic R&D. JF-22 alone is reported above USD 500m; cumulative hypersonic investment (2016–2025) is comparable to crewed-spaceflight outlays—indicating top-tier priority.

Chinese doctrinal publications frame hypersonics within “systems versus systems”: modern war pits integrated detection-command-fires architectures against one another. The Academy of Military Sciences’ Science of Military Strategy highlights hypersonics under “active deterrence”, imposing dilemmas on adversaries. “Long-range precision fires fusion” describes integrating hypersonics with cyber and EW to saturate defences and paralyse critical nodes. A2/AD makes hypersonics a component within a wider architecture: ISR satellites, over-the-horizon radar, reconnaissance drones, AEW&C platforms and low-latency encrypted links. DF-17 and YJ-21 are tools within a system designed to reduce adversary freedom of action inside the first island chain.

Hypothetical employment includes DF-17 salvos to stress THAAD-class defences in the ROK; YJ-21 from Type 055 coordinated with DF-21D to threaten carrier groups; and credible hypersonic threats to ports, airfields or logistics nodes to slow allied reinforcements to Taiwan.

Public communication is carefully managed. CCTV’s 2019 parade coverage emphasised supposed invulnerability; Xinhua’s 2021 reporting on the fractional-orbital-like test framed a “strategic revolution”. DoD/CSIS analyses have tempered such claims, noting operational validation in real combat remains unproven.

Structural vulnerabilities include constrained access to ASML EUV tools (limiting cutting-edge microelectronics), safety/quality risks in rapidly scaled high-enthalpy facilities, and organisational frictions revealed in Rocket Force reforms. On capability–will–communication: capability is rising (industrial base, critical materials), will is very high (priority, resources), communication is effective but partly propagandistic. Ultimate credibility hinges on resolving microelectronic gaps and demonstrating repeatable performance under contested conditions.

Europe and France: selective autonomy, cooperative programmes and the challenge of hypersonic defence

Europe’s approach reflects its political-military architecture: national initiatives—France foremost—alongside EU-level programmes. European ambition focuses less on mass offensive fielding and more on defending against external threats, consolidating an industrial base and preserving technological autonomy. France adds a distinctive note: maintaining a sovereign nuclear deterrent requires projecting the ability to field state-of-the-art vectors, potentially including hypersonic ones.

France launched ASN4G in 2019 as the hypersonic successor to ASMP-A, slated for Rafale F5 in the mid-2030s as an air-delivered nuclear vector. In June 2023 the first V-MAX hypersonic glider demonstrator flight from French Guiana—led by ArianeGroup—was announced a success.

At EU level, HYDEF (European Hypersonic Defence Interceptor) was approved in 2022 under the EDF with EUR 100m initial funding, coordinated by Spain and Germany with Sener, GMV and Diehl; an EU interceptor is targeted around 2035. In parallel, HYDIS²—led by MBDA France/Italy—matures interception technologies, sensors and data fusion. These sit within the 2022 Strategic Compass and the proposed EDIP framework, aimed at autonomy and industrial resilience.

France’s industrial ecosystem includes ArianeGroup (V-MAX/ASN4G), MBDA (missiles, HYDIS²), Safran (propulsion, navigation) and ONERA (aerothermodynamics, wind tunnels). OCCAR coordinates EU programmes. Weaknesses persist: limited military-scale GaN/SiC foundries and dependence on refined rare earths (largely from China). The Critical Raw Materials Act (2023) will take time to bite. Europe is strong in systems design and integration, including sensors and propulsion, but still relies on partners for critical chains.

European hypersonic funding is modest compared to the US or China: France commits several hundred million euros annually to ASN4G and V-MAX within a EUR 5.6bn deterrent budget (2023); the EU, EUR 100m for HYDEF and c. EUR 80m for HYDIS²’s initial phase. Even if smaller, these outlays represent a qualitative shift: Europe is financing its own interceptor R&D.

Doctrinally, France integrates hypersonics into its nuclear deterrent, with ASN4G as part of the airborne leg ensuring penetration of advanced defences. The 2021 National Strategic Review and the 2024–2030 Loi de Programmation Militaire cover nuclear continuity and hypersonic investment. The EU’s stance is defensive: the Strategic Compass highlights Russian/Iranian hypersonic threats and the need for European IAMD; HYDEF/HYDIS² respond to that diagnosis.

In notional employment, ASN4G would guarantee French nuclear penetration; HYDEF would integrate with NATO’s missile-defence architecture to protect European bases and populations. French communication stresses sovereignty and nuclear continuity; EU communication stresses resilience and industrial cohesion.

Limitations are clear: gaps in critical chains, modest budgets, partial reliance on NATO. In capability–will–communication terms, Europe presents medium capability (strong systems, weak in critical chains), growing will, coherent messaging. Its autonomy is selective rather than total, but credible in defence.

Other regional actors

India is developing HSTDV and BrahMos-II, framed as a credible minimum deterrent vis-à-vis China and Pakistan. Japan advances HVGP for coastal defence; the Republic of Korea pursues Hycore, leveraging a world-class civil semiconductor sector while adapting to military GaN/SiC requirements. Israel prioritises defence (Arrow-4); Iran and Turkey seek regional visibility with Fattah and Tayfun respectively. Australia consolidates its role as a logistics and testing partner within AUKUS.

Critical supply chains and deterrent credibility

The hypersonic supply chain is the deterrence chain. NdFeB/SmCo magnets, UHTC/C-C thermal protection, GaN/SiC power electronics and hardened avionics are the material core. Concentration of rare-earth refining in China, dependence on ASML for EUV and limited aerospace-grade UHTC capacity mean national programmes stand or fall on such links.

Risk is very high for rare earths and GaN/SiC; high for UHTC/avionics; medium for testing/logistics. Mitigations include magnet recycling, new EU/US separation plants, offtake contracts (Australia/Canada), allied foundry duplication, near-shoring of UHTC lines and university–industry consortia. Timelines matter: separation plants (3–7 years), military GaN/SiC foundries (5–7), aerospace-grade UHTC/C-C lines (2–5). Strategy must fund missiles and the chain that makes them possible.

The conclusion is clear. A Mach figure without magnets or GaN/SiC is an empty promise; an anti-hypersonic architecture without UHTC or space sensors is incomplete. Twenty-first-century defence policy must manage both the physics of speed and the political economy of materials. Only when both converge within realistic timelines and budgets does deterrence become a verifiable capability.

Chapter IV: Intercepting and Defending Against Hypersonic Missiles: Architecture, Physical Limits, Verification and Operating Economics

Defence against hypersonic missiles compels a shift in missile-defence paradigms: from relatively predictable terminal engagements to near-continuous track custody, with reliable cross-layer data transfers and firing decisions inside compressed time windows. No single system suffices; the viable response is a system of systems that “buys back” time and geometry against vectors designed to deny both. The resulting architecture is unavoidably multi-layer, multi-modal and, in practice, multinational.

Physical foundations and the window of opportunity

A gliding hypersonic vehicle manoeuvres at intermediate altitudes (roughly 20–70 km) with high Mach numbers and heading changes that degrade purely ballistic models. The engagement window is the time between confirmed detection and a fire solution; the entire defensive design aims to widen it. Stagnation temperature conditions infrared signature, ablation and manoeuvre envelope. For an ideal compressible flow, T0 = T·[1 + (γ − 1)·M²/2]. At Mach 7 in stratospheric air (T≈220 K), T≈220 K, T0 ~1,600 K, justifying high-sensitivity IR sensors and robust discrimination against thermal false positives. Simple geometry underscores the need for a space layer: for a sensor height hh over Earth radius RR, the radar/optical horizon is d ≈ √(2·R·h) si h ≪ R. A radar at 20 km has ~500 km horizon; a LEO sensor at 1,000 km sees ~3,570 km. Space is indispensable for sustained track custody.

Space layer for detection and custody

The space constellation is the first operational requirement. Three choices define it: orbit, spectral bands and link architecture. LEO provides revisit and lower latency at the cost of communications complexity; MEO/GEO improves continuity but penalises latency/geometry. Combining MWIR/LWIR (hypersonic signatures) with SWIR (context) optimises sensitivity; focal-plane quality (HgCdTe, InSb or SLS) and cryocoolers set signal-to-noise. Links must be secure, low-latency and resilient, prioritising track updates. The priorities remain: early detection, persistent tracking, reliable hand-off.

Surface and embarked sensors

Over-the-horizon radars provide initial volume search; refinement for interceptor guidance comes from X-/S-band AESA with GaN power stages. Contemporary architectures mix bi-/multistatic modes to curb stealth/jamming vulnerabilities, leaning on coastal and naval nodes to share tracks and mark engagements for proximal interceptors. In littorals, naval radar delivers terminal discrimination where ground-based horizons limit geometry. EO/IR embarked sensors add last-instant confirmation when weather permits.

Data fusion, machine learning and validation

Hypersonic defence fails if fusion is brittle. Sensor chains must tolerate intermittent loss, plasma-induced degradation, asynchronous measurements and noise. State estimators with hypersonic manoeuvre models and multi-hypothesis trackers preserve physically plausible trajectories until new observations collapse ambiguity. Machine learning adds value in signature classification, queue management and trajectory prediction, but demands rigorous V&V: curated datasets, degraded-environment testing, adversarial robustness and meaningful human supervision over lethal actions. Without this, automation can inject invisible bias at the command console.

Interceptors: glide and terminal phases

Intercepting during glide maximises probability against HGVs, which still retain energy but have not begun the most aggressive terminal manoeuvres. This imposes interceptors with strong lateral acceleration margins, dual RF/IR seekers and jamming-tolerant data-links. Terminal approaches can work in limited scenarios, but windows are short and attackers will combine evasive manoeuvres with sensor degradation. In both cases, time-to-go and trajectory-prediction quality are decisive; DACS-style divert thrusters, thrust-vectoring and fine-discrimination hit-to-kill are enabling technologies.

Non-kinetic measures and directed energy

Electronic warfare can degrade attacker navigation (jamming/spoofing) and targeting links, reducing terminal guidance quality. Deception with physical/thermal decoys and cyber operations against attacker C2/logistics are cost-effective multipliers. High-energy directed-energy options add point-defence possibilities; efficacy against robust TPS gliders is unproven at scale, but combined with kinetics can raise terminal lethality. Atmospheric propagation, turbulence and thermal management define envelopes; high rate-of-fire and deep magazines are relative advantages versus attacker missile economics.

Theatre-specific architectures

At sea, defence focuses on naval groups with AESA radars, cooperative links and shipborne fires sharing tracks with space and coastal sensors. In continental Europe, emphasis rests on dense land networks with robust backhaul, NATO/EU interoperability and layered critical-infrastructure protection. In the Indo-Pacific archipelago, geometry favours overlapping “bubbles” from allied islands with sensors and mobile batteries, supported by LEO constellations maintaining custody along maritime corridors.

Test, evaluation and operational certification

Without representative test campaigns, defence is rhetorical. A T&E pyramid builds confidence: high-level simulation and digital twins; hardware-in-the-loop seeker/link benches; hypersonic tunnels validating signature models; and staged live-fire events with surrogate targets and aggressive EW. Certification should include joint probability metrics—space/surface detection, fusion, assignment, interceptor Pk—and hand-off latency. Repeatability is the antidote to technological surprise.

Defence economics and magazine logistics

Cost-for-cost matters. Viable systems need depth of magazines and reload tempos exceeding salvo cadence. A mix of effectors is required: high-Pk kinetics for priority targets; non-kinetics and deception to thin salvos; directed energy for point defence. Logistics shapes strategy: without resupply, the first salvo decides. Planning must include interceptor stocks, seeker spares and scheduled maintenance for space-sensor cryogenics.

Governance, rules of engagement and crisis management

Technical excellence demands clear employment rules minimising error-driven escalation. Engagement thresholds, fire authority, automation conditions and safe degradations must be defined pre-crisis. Limited technical transparency—test notifications, crisis hotlines, safeguards against strategic spoofing—reduces the chance of error-driven escalation. Responsible defence comprises interceptors, but also rules, data and shared language.

Industrial base and standardisation

Hypersonic defence depends on four industrial bases: GaN/SiC semiconductors for radar/power; IR focal planes and high-reliability cryocoolers; UHTC/C-C for radomes; and military-grade packaging with radiation-tolerant electronics. European capacity is incipient in semiconductors/FPAs; moderate in UHTC/C-C; reliant on alliances for hardened avionics. Technical standardisation (NATO/EU) and cross-certification accelerate chain maturation.

Attacker countermeasures and multisensor discrimination

Hypersonic missiles may carry cooled thermal decoys, reflectors and micro-zig-zags to force track breaks. Defence should respond with multispectral fusion (MWIR+LWIR, and SWIR/UV where feasible), radar polarimetry to differentiate surface textures, and high-PRF Doppler to capture control-surface micromotions hard to spoof. Multi-hypothesis association and JPDA-style assignment with adaptive kinematic windows and strict temporal coherence reduce decoy persistence. Plasma-induced RF attenuation creates windows for EO/IR custody—use them.

PNT resilience and C2 cyber-security

GNSS loss or degradation in crisis demands reinforced interceptor navigation and C2 synchronisation via high-grade INS recalibrated by stellar references, LEO-based PNT and, where available, low-frequency terrestrial aids. Network time synchronisation—critical to hand-off and fire assignment—should include disciplined clocks and two-way time-transfer protocols. Cyber-security requires zero-trust architecture, robust cross-domain guards, signed telemetry and explicit fail-safe profiles to avoid opaque automation decisions.

Expanded operational scenarios

In the Baltic–Kaliningrad corridor, a LEO constellation shares tracks with Northern European OTH radars; hand-off to coastal X-band radars cues an endo-atmospheric interceptor engaging at mid-altitude; EW and decoys protect energy nodes. In the Eastern Mediterranean, cooperative naval defence with multinode links and space cueing enables distributed fire assignment; directed energy protects a critical port terminally. In the Indo-Pacific archipelago, overlapping island bubbles combine sensors and batteries; long-range conventional fires deny launch points; combined maritime-coastal defence thins A2/AD salvos.

Automation guardrails and human role

Final recommendations

Prioritise the space layer and rigorously validated fusion; without custody there is no defence. Accelerate glide-phase interceptors and integrate them with naval and land radars, with theatre-specific latency targets. Fund industrial capacity in GaN/SiC, IR focal planes and UHTC/C-C through university–industry consortia and NATO/EU cross-certification. Institutionalise ROE and crisis channels to reduce error-driven escalation risk. Establish a realistic “missile economy” mixing kinetic, non-kinetic and directed-energy effectors to maximise survival and cost-effectiveness.

Selected references for this chapter (integrable into the global bibliography): CRS (R45811); MDA/DoD updates on GPI and tracking layers; EUISS/IISS/SIPRI dossiers on IAMD and hypersonics in Europe; OCCAR/European Commission fiches for HYDEF/HYDIS²; ONERA/JHU-APL technical work on hypersonic aerothermodynamics and instrumentation; and recent publications on GaN/SiC, MWIR/LWIR focal planes and cryocoolers.

Chapter V: Doctrine, Deterrence, Proliferation and Governance of Hypersonic Missiles

This chapter places hypersonic missiles within their doctrinal and strategic frame: as an intermediate rung on the escalation ladder, as a multiplier for a conventional first strike, and as a factor that compresses political decision-time. Realist deterrence is re-read through capability, will and communication, showing the stabilising/destabilising ambivalence of speed. Proliferation appears selective, constrained by industrial, infrastructural and doctrinal barriers. International humanitarian law does not per se prohibit the weapon, but demands distinction, proportionality and feasible precautions within short decision windows (Article 36 reviews). MTCR, HCoC and Wassenaar help but are insufficient; a staged governance approach—limited technical transparency and crisis guardrails—is proposed. Simple success metrics (pre-notifications, tested hotlines, supply-chain audits and hand-off latency targets) anchor governance in measurable outcomes.

Doctrine—national approaches and where the hypersonic weapon sits in escalation

Major powers have assigned hypersonic missiles distinct functions that converge on one aim: compress the adversary’s decision-time and raise intervention costs. The United States embeds them in conventional prompt strike: rapid, long-range conventional options for high-value or mobile targets, with the ambition of avoiding nuclear escalation. Russia folds them into active deterrence and “escalate-to-de-escalate”, as early crisis signalling and as a strategic penetrator within the triad. China treats them as the apex of an A2/AD architecture integrated with cyber and electronic warfare. France ties its bet to continuity in airborne nuclear deterrence, while the EU prioritises interceptors and sensors for a layered defensive approach. India, Japan and the Republic of Korea adapt them to regional deterrence, shored up by alliances and resilience.

Signalling theory and decision-time: when speed matters, and when it destabilises

Speed reduces political time to verify, consult and decide. From signalling theory, the hypersonic weapon alters the game if it allows the sender to emit a capacity signal the receiver cannot ignore without risk. When the signal is credible and the receiver has time to process it, stability can improve; when time is insufficient and payload is ambiguous, the receiver may default to worst-case choices. The inflection point between reinforced deterrence and destabilisation lies not in Mach number but in the relationship between detection windows, data fusion and crisis protocols. Limited technical transparency and maintained communication channels pare back the uncertainty that can turn speed into panic rather than policy.

Deterrence by denial and by punishment in the hypersonic era

Punishment is reinforced if the attacker can reach critical nodes with low interception probability; denial is reinforced if the defender can disperse, harden and deceive enough for the first strike not to decide. Hypersonics operate on both planes, but credibility depends on each side’s “missile economy”. No vector is invulnerable; no defence is perfect. Strategic stability improves when both parties internalise rising marginal costs for offence and defensive densities that deny decisive first-strike gains.

Conventional–nuclear entanglement and risks to NC3

Hypersonic weapons share environments and sometimes vectors and sensors with nuclear or dual systems. Entanglement risks arise when a conventional strike on C2 nodes, early-warning sensors or dual-use bases degrades the adversary’s nuclear perception. If that adversary believes its NC3 network has been compromised, it may escalate pre-emptively to avoid strategic blindness. Concepts of operation should exclude routes and patterns associated with nuclear employment, separating tracks, altitudes and time windows where feasible, and be accompanied by doctrinal signals that bound ambiguity.

Proliferation: real barriers and diffusion vectors

Proliferation is possible, but not trivial. There are industrial barriers (NdFeB/SmCo magnets, UHTC/C-C TPS, GaN/SiC power devices, hardened avionics), infrastructural barriers (high-enthalpy tunnels, seeker benches, live-fire campaigns) and doctrinal barriers (mature C4ISR). Diffusion may nonetheless occur via technical-military cooperation, spill-over from advanced civil programmes and grey markets for dual-use components. The most likely trajectory is selective proliferation: major powers plus a set of regional actors with broad industrial bases—not indiscriminate spread.

Legal frame and IHL: from principle to operational guidance

International humanitarian law does not per se prohibit hypersonic missiles; it demands compliance with distinction, proportionality and feasible precautions. Compressed windows do not excuse failure to verify or to minimise collateral harm; they oblige processes and tools that make compliance feasible. Article 36 reviews should include, beyond the abstract legality of the weapon, its interaction with the targeting cycle, sensor quality and latency, data traceability in fire decisions, and post-strike damage auditing.

Staged governance: from the feasible to the desirable

A useful governance architecture does not seek a grand treaty at once; it proposes feasible steps that, together, improve stability. First, technical-operational: minimum test pre-notifications with windows, altitudes and exclusion areas; standardised NAVAREA/NOTAM templates; tested military hotlines. Second, limited transparency: voluntary test registries with core fields and a light technical secretariat; codes of conduct to avoid profiles that maximise nuclear ambiguity; and, in narrowly defined cases, shared telemetry to resolve incidents. Third, institutional: adjustments to MTCR, HCoC and Wassenaar to reflect industrial chains and test profiles, with adherence incentives and reputational costs for deviation.

Export controls and traceability

MTCR, HCoC and Wassenaar can be reinforced with traceability clauses for high-risk components and due diligence across critical chains. Customs cooperation, export-control agencies and industry must counter “salami-sliced” shipments of rare-earth oxides, GaN/SiC parts or CVD/HIP equipment. Defence contracts should include obligations to substitute suppliers quickly when concentration risk is detected.

Political economy of deterrence: costs, series and sustainability

Credibility resides in series, not in prototypes. The political economy of deterrence compares marginal costs of offence and defence at each rung. If an interceptor costs far more than an attack missile, the attacker is incentivised to saturation; if defence blends kinetics, non-kinetics and directed energy and achieves favourable terminal ratios, saturation incentives fall. Budgets must internalise replacement and network/sensor sustainment costs, not only acquisition.

Governance success metrics

Governance needs metrics—modest but measurable: percentage of tests pre-notified to template; number of hotline drills per year; response times and mean hand-off latencies in exercises; number of critical-chain traceability audits; reduced notification incidents by zone.

Hypothetical case studies

In the Baltic, a limited salvo from Kaliningrad against Polish energy nodes would test NATO’s alert/hand-off architecture. Neutralisation would rely on LEO satellites, X-band radars and a mix of interceptors and deception; success would lower the chance of a second salvo—denial signalling. In the South China Sea, an anti-carrier manoeuvre would require multinode cueing from space and naval discrimination; inability to deny the first hit does not equal defeat if defence preserves critical functions and the attacker gains no decisive operational effect. In the Middle East, a demonstrative hypersonic use by a regional actor would test pre-notice norms and crisis lines; a prompt, measured response would dampen imitators’ incentives.

A final reading: doctrine, deterrence and governance in convergence

Hypersonic technology does not repeal deterrence logic; it stresses it. It inserts speed where political time is scarce; introduces ambiguity in dual systems; forces protocol reform in crises. Useful governance will not promise the impossible; it will reduce the space for grave error: clarify doctrines, signal intentions, harden channels, adapt control regimes to real chains, and accept that modern deterrence rests as much on sensors and algorithms as on habits of cooperation. Doctrinal excellence will come from coherence—reproducible capability, explicit will, plausible communication—and prudence: using speed to create political options, not to rob time from judgement.

Chapter VI: 2030–2035 Scenarios, Sensitivity Analysis and Strategic Recommendations (final version)

The 2030–2035 horizon for hypersonic missiles will not be determined by a Mach figure but by the convergence of four vectors: resilient critical chains (NdFeB/SmCo magnets, UHTC/C-C, GaN/SiC), track custody from space with sub-second latencies, an offence–defence dialectic that makes the first salvo economically costly, and governance that turns speed into a policy option without triggering strategic panic. Three plausible scenarios are modelled (prudent cooperation, contained competition, crisis spiral), stress-tested (LEO delays, rare-earth shocks, GaN/SiC gaps, hand-off latencies, scramjet reliability), and read across theatres (Indo-Pacific, Europe, Middle East). A 2025–2035 roadmap, verifiable metrics and an implementation plan with responsibilities are proposed. The final thesis is realist: credibility equals reproducible capability plus explicit will plus plausible communication; without that triad, speed destabilises.

Methodology and assumptions

The scenarios combine industrial trends (rare-earth separation, GaN/SiC foundries, UHTC/C-C lines), technological maturity (TRL/MRL/SRL for interceptors, sensors and C2), published doctrines and test chronologies with track custody. Sensitivities are expressed in qualitative and semi-quantitative ranges (target latencies, engagement windows, joint defence probability thresholds). Red-teaming is applied: for each key assumption we identify how it could be falsified and what corrective action would follow.

Scenario 1. Prudent cooperation (moderate probability; stabilising impact)

Major powers recognise the rising cost of an unrestrained hypersonic race and converge on limited technical transparency: standardised pre-notifications, common NAVAREA/NOTAM templates, verified hotlines and channel exercises. Glide-phase interceptors reach reasonable IOC in critical theatres; LEO constellations achieve density for sub-second hand-off in exercises; the “missile economy” blends kinetic effectors, deception, electronic warfare and directed energy for point defence. Proliferation remains selective and deterrence rests more on credible denial than on inescapable punishment.

Scenario 2. Contained competition (base probability; mixed impact)

The race intensifies without catastrophic break. The United States, Russia and China consolidate limited but improving arsenals; Europe/France notch IAMD milestones; Japan and the Republic of Korea stabilise regional programmes. Industry remains the bottleneck: GaN/SiC, IR focal planes and rare-earth refining set the pace. Defences improve but attackers learn to sequence salvos and blend vectors with cyber/EW. Governance advances piecemeal (pre-notices, hotlines), with opacity patches in crises. Stability is fragile, sustained by recognition of rising costs and the impossibility of a first strike without reprisal.

Scenario 3. Crisis spiral and misattribution (low–medium probability; high destabilising impact)

A misattributed hypersonic impact—or the perception of a nuclear payload—triggers worst-case decision-making. Track-custody failures, high latencies and inactive hotlines lead to retaliatory steps. Defence improvises, magazines are exhausted, and rules are negotiated ex post. Loss of confidence and reputational damage force governance reform.

Critical sensitivities

LEO delay (≥24 months). Degrades joint defence probability, pushes reliance onto costlier terminal layers. Mitigation: layered partial IOC, reinforced backhaul, edge compute to cut latency.
Rare-earth shock (–30% Dy/Tb over 12–18 months). Hits actuators and availability. Mitigation: recycling, offtake contracts, critical stocks, partial substitution.
Military GaN/SiC gap. Penalises radar power and terminal refinement. Mitigation: allied capex in foundries, European military-grade packaging, advance purchases.
Hand-off latency >3 s. Makes glide-phase interception marginal. Mitigation: network optimisation, telemetry prioritisation, intermediate nodes, edge compute.
Scramjet reliability below threshold. Reduces HCM credibility. Mitigation: ignition/stability campaigns, hybrid profiles, staged transition via HGV.

Early-warning indicators

Theatre implications

Indo-Pacific. Dispersion posture, hardened bases, archipelagic bubbles, allied LEO custody, kill-web C2 with edge compute, denial of launch points via LRHW/CPS/allies.

Europe. Dense land network interoperable with NATO/EU, a European LEO layer coupled to allies, European glide-phase interceptors at IOC, NATO–EU fire-assignment coordination, critical-infrastructure protection and “missile economy” doctrines.

Middle East. Multi-layer defence with fast attribution, combined space–surface custody, EW/deception layers and iterative lessons from mixed salvos.

2025–2035 roadmap

2025–2027. Partial LEO custody IOC; AI-fusion pilots with V&V; capex for GaN/SiC foundries and rare-earth separation plants; pre-notice and hotline drills; glide-phase live-fire under EW.

2028–2031. Mature sensor networks; interceptor IOC; high-reliability military packaging and IR focal planes; allied ROE with supervised automation; active governance metrics (≥80% pre-notices; ≥4 hotline exercises/year).

2032–2035. Multi-layer FOC; stabilised critical chains; consolidated codes of conduct; light verification; cost-effective mix of kinetic/non-kinetic/directed-energy effectors.

Recommendations by actor

European Union/France. Complete the IAMD triangle (space, sensors, interceptors); fund foundries and military packaging with industrial return; traceability clauses in contracts; institutionalise pre-notices and NATO/EU hotlines; common hand-off metrics.

United States. Accelerate GPI and the space layer with latency targets; harden GaN/SiC and IR-focal chains; selective transparency and crisis guardrails; avoid programme dispersion that dilutes operational volume.

Japan/Republic of Korea. Base resilience, rare-earth stockpiles and recycling; LEO-custody interoperability; distributed fire assignment; ROE with human-in-the-loop.

India. Close refining and microelectronics gaps; prioritise robust C2 and sensors; mature scramjets; adopt hybrid profiles and HGV as a bridge.

Israel. Export lessons on layered defence and fast attribution; contribute to fusion/ROE standards; cooperate on the space layer.
Allied industry. University–industry consortia for UHTC/C-C; NATO/EU normalisation for seekers and links; C2 cyber/PNT audits; industrial-scale NdFeB recycling.

Success metrics

Quantitative decision framework
Joint defence probability against a glider can be approximated as P_J = P_D × P_F × P_A × P_K​ (detection, valid fusion, fire assignment, kill probability). Indicative theatre thresholds:

Missile economy: practical rules

If the attacker launches a salvo N at unit cost, and the defender adds m kinetic effectors per target plus non-kinetics and directed energy where relevant, expected defender cost is C_d ≈ m·c_k + α·c_ew + β·c_de​. Three useful rules follow: i) pushing m above 2 rarely improves PJP_JPJ​ more than investing in fusion/latency; ii) first pound to LEO custody and hand-off, second to glide-phase interceptors, third to non-kinetics; iii) directed energy is efficient when it sharply cuts marginal terminal cost in point defence.

Implementation plan 2025–2035 and responsibilities

Actors and levers

Risk register and mitigation

Minimum research agenda 2025–2030

Fusion and AI with adversarial V&V; glide-signature physics (MWIR/LWIR libraries and EO/IR windows under plasma); scramjets (ignition/stability/regenerative cooling) and hybrid HCM/HGV profiles; theatre-specific missile-economy models; REE and military GaN/SiC foresight under shocks; interoperable pre-notice templates and technical-attribution protocols; hotline drills with public performance evaluation.

Conclusion of the section

The hypersonic 2030–2035 horizon will hinge on critical chains, operational verification, multi-layer defence and crisis governance. Excellence invests where time is genuinely gained: LEO custody, fusion and V&V, glide-phase interceptors, foundries and rare-earth separation, and crisis protocols that return margin to judgement. Where reproducible capability, explicit will and plausible communication converge, speed is policy; where they do not, speed is panic.

Conclusion

This dossier has shown that hypersonics is not a technological shortcut to invulnerability but a field in which physics, industry and policy are inextricably intertwined. Speed and manoeuvrability, by themselves, do not confer strategic power; what does is the ability to turn them into a reproducible capability, integrated into detection and command architectures, defended against countermeasures and governed by rules that reduce the probability of error. Across six chapters we have sustained a simple and demanding thesis: deterrent credibility rests on the convergence of reproducible capability, explicit will and plausible communication. Where any one of these pieces fails, the hypersonic promise becomes rhetoric; where the three align, speed ceases to be a panic factor and becomes a useful policy option.

Technically, hard limits do not disappear. Aerothermodynamics, guidance in ionised environments, scramjet stability and thermal management impose conditions that proclamations cannot resolve. This work has set out equations, orders of magnitude and their operational implications to separate what is physically feasible from what is improbable. Likewise, defence against hypersonic missiles is not a single interceptor but an architecture: track custody from space, validated multisensor fusion, modern radars, glide-phase interceptors, non-kinetic measures and clear rules of engagement. Viability is not measured in datasheets but in joint defence probability and the real latency of hand-off.

The industrial analysis has been unequivocal. No hypersonic programme is sustainable without resilient critical chains: NdFeB/SmCo magnets, UHTC and C/C thermal-protection systems, wide-bandgap GaN/SiC power electronics and hardened avionics. The concentration of rare-earth refining, dependence on advanced lithography and limited aerospace-grade UHTC capacity reveal that the “weakest link” is often the true strategic bottleneck. The realistic answer is not autarky but a combination of diversification, recycling, investment in sovereign capacity and offtake agreements that turn structural vulnerabilities into manageable risks.

Actor by actor, trajectories diverge but constraints converge. The United States has moved from point records to the pursuit of repeatable reliability, with a plural portfolio and the challenge of series production. Russia has turned early fielding into a communicative asset, yet with shadows over industrial sustainability. China has built the most systemic ecosystem—mass of testing, doctrinal integration, advantage in resources—whilst carrying technological gaps in cutting-edge microelectronics and the need for validation in real war. Europe and France have bet on defence and on selective autonomy that reconciles strengths in systems with the maturation of critical links. India, Japan and the Republic of Korea have calibrated ambition and alliances in a regional key. In every case, strategic value depends less on Mach than on the ability to sustain over time what is proclaimed.

For stability and deterrence, hypersonics is an ambivalent multiplier. It can reinforce punishment by lowering interception probability and shortening time-to-target; it can also underpin denial if multilayer defences raise the cost of the first salvo. But compressed time and technological ambiguity increase the risk of misattribution and error-driven escalation, especially when conventional systems and nuclear networks share sensors, nodes or doctrines. The answer is not to deny physics but to add governance to technique: limited transparency in testing, verified hotlines, pre-notification templates, technical-attribution protocols and automation rules with effective human supervision.

The 2030–2035 scenarios confirm the outcome is not fatalistic. Prudent cooperation—bounded technical transparency, active hotlines, practical codes of conduct—is compatible with technological competition if actors internalise the cost of the race and the utility of measuring what matters: real hand-off latencies, joint defence probability, inventory availability and chain resilience. Contained competition will remain the base case: limited arsenals and improving defences under industrial pressure. The worst case—crisis spiral and misattribution—is less likely but high-impact; mitigating it requires investing early in the links that buy political time: LEO custody, validated fusion, glide-phase interceptors, foundries and rare-earth separation, and rehearsed crisis rules.

This work has proposed verifiable metrics and a roadmap with intermediate milestones. The aim is not to promise invulnerability but to commit to auditable timelines and outcomes: percentages of tests with pre-notice, successful hotline drills, average hand-off latencies, interception rates in representative campaigns, duplication of allied military foundries, Nd/Pr recycling capacity and critical stocks to absorb shocks. The missile economy should incorporate, realistically, that the first pound goes to track custody and fusion; the second, to glide-phase interceptors; and the third, to non-kinetics and deception that thin salvos and make terminal layers efficient.

Europe receives a dual task from this dossier. First, complete the IAMD triangle—space layer, sensors and interceptors—with public indicators of progress; second, close industrial gaps in GaN/SiC, IR focal planes and rare earths through investment, alliances and traceability norms. The United States must consolidate repeatable production, protect critical chains and fine-tune selective transparency and crisis guardrails. China must demonstrate repeatable performance under contested conditions and manage the gap between propaganda and evidence; Russia, turn signalling into sustainable capacity. Japan and the Republic of Korea can continue to lead industrial resilience in recycling and semiconductors; India, the transition from lab to series with robust C2 and sensors; Israel, rapid attribution and layered defence as a practical school.

The principal limitation of this study is the inherent opacity of sensitive programmes and the volatility of industrial data. To address it, we have made ranges, assumptions and verification methods explicit; where evidence is insufficient, we have proposed metrics and processes to measure and govern. The research agenda ahead is concrete: fusion and AI with adversarial validation; glide-signature physics and EO/IR windows under plasma; scramjet ignition and stability; theatre-specific missile-economy; rare-earth and military GaN/SiC foresight under shocks; and standardised pre-notice templates and technical-attribution protocols.

This dossier does not end with a promise of absolute control but with a commitment to measurement and governance. In an era of speed, stability is secured by those who know where time is truly gained: in sensors that sustain track, networks that transfer without intolerable latencies, defences that combine layers, and industrial chains that do not snap at the first shock. Read with realism, hypersonics does not oblige an unbridled race; it obliges technical, industrial and political maturity commensurate with the risks it introduces. Where reproducible capability, explicit will and plausible communication converge, speed will be a responsible instrument of deterrence. That is the yardstick by which decisions following these pages should be judged.

Methodological Note on Unverifiable Data

When reproducing a figure provided by an official source without independent verification, it is indicated in the text and/or in a footnote. Where sources diverge, priority is given to consolidated governmental reports (CRS), high-impact think tanks (RAND, IISS, SIPRI, EUISS, IFRI, SWP) and peer-reviewed literature (JHU/APL, Nature Communications). No quantitative conclusions beyond that evidence are drawn.

Methodological note

Estimates of consumption, costs and timeframes are sourced from USGS (2025), NDIA (2023), CRS (2025), JECS (2023) and articles on materials (Peters et al., 2024). Chinese literature has been incorporated from summaries and authorised translations of CAS and CAAA documents. Figures relating to Russian and Chinese programmes should be read with caution given the limitations of independent verification; they are therefore presented as orders of magnitude rather than absolute values.

Glossary

Mach: ratio between vehicle speed and speed of sound in the medium.

HGV: Hypersonic Glide Vehicle.

HCM: Hypersonic Cruise Missile (scramjet-powered).

TPS: Thermal Protection System.

UHTC: Ultra-High Temperature Ceramics.

INS: Inertial Navigation System.

A2/AD: Anti-Access/Area Denial.

C2/C4ISR: command and control / command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

IHL: international humanitarian law.

HCoC: Hague Code of Conduct.

IAMD: integrated air and missile defence.

MTCR: Missile Technology Control Regime.

NC3: nuclear command, control and communications.

ROE: rules of engagement.

track custody: continuous target tracking over time.

hand-off: transfer of track between sensors/nodes to produce a fire solution.

Pk: kill probability of the effector.

IOC/FOC: initial/final operating capability.

edge compute: computation at the network edge to reduce latency.

V&V: validation and verification.

HOTL/HITL: human-on-the-loop / hardware-in-the-loop.

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